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I.
Universal (common) traits of co-operative property
I t is of frequent occurrence in scientific work that a problem once settled 
has to be made subject to a thorough study once again mainly to explore other 
relations or regularities implied in it. This is a frequent phenomenon in par­
ticular in the social sciences, and within them even to a higher degree in the 
scope of political sciences and jurisprudence.
Actually political sciences and jurisprudence are in a phase of evolution 
where in the light of the new mechanism of economic management investiga­
tion has to be re-opened for a number of problems which already formed the 
subject matter of research work in an earlier phase, and which at that time had 
been assigned to their proper places in both theory and legislation.
Among others, a typical problem of this type is that of ownership. Since the 
Liberation, a fairly significant place has been allotted in Hungarian jurispruden­
ce to the study of the various problems of the theory of socialist ownership. 
Theoretical studies of socialist ownership made rapid headway in particular 
when these studies came to be associated with the drafting work of proposed 
legislation in one or the other of the more important scopes. Thus theory di­
rectly came to the aid of legislative work, and then, in the wake of legislation, 
helped the establishment of a proper and uniform practice of the courts. As 
examples it may suffice to quote Act IV of 1959, i. e. the Civil Code, or Law- 
Decree No. 7 of 1959 on the agricultural producers’ co-operatives, or Acts III  
and IV of 1967, respectively, on co-operatives and on landed property.
In Hungary, the new method of economic management has shaped a new, 
on the whole uniform co-operative policy. To this end, among others, the prob­
lem of co-operative property has come to the fore again in a novel manner, 
namely in the first place for the purpose of a study of the common, general 
rules, characteristic peculiarities, which may be discovered in co-operative 
property in all its forms in existence in Hungary, or which, if not at present but 
as a peculiarity permitting generalization, manifest themselves in one or an 
other form of co-operative property. Hence the primary objective of this paper 
is an inquiry into this problem.
1. Apart from certain in many respects antiquated theses of ownership of 
the now twenty-year-old Hungarian Constitution, in Hungarian legislation
some of the general rules of co-operative ownership have for the first time and 
to this day exclusively been brought under regulation by the Civil Code.
The Civil Code has integrated the general rules of co-operative ownership 
partly with the general rules of ownership, partly with the special rules applying 
to social ownership, on the understanding that, in general, these rules apply 
not only to the various concrete forms of co-operative property, but also on the 
assumption that in general the rules governing co-operative property are nor­
mative also for the property of social organization and associations. In fact 
these, too, come within the sphere of socialist group property and do not create 
an autonomous form of property. Or, in a simplified form, this means that the 
Civil Code contains the general rules of co-operative property with a claim that, 
in general, these are also the general rules of group property, hence with the 
exception of state property they apply to all other forms of social group pro­
perty.
Ten years ago, when the Civil Code was ready for promulgation, in all 
certainty general rules of this type could be formulated for group property 
with proper reason, although certain doubts may have emerged in this conne­
xion already at that time, as is clearly reflected by the preamble to the Civil 
Code at several places. At the same time, even today, the opinion still firmly 
holds its own that since the Civil Code incorporates the general rules which for 
group property, and within it in the first place for co-operative property, could 
be generalized at all, it is either superfluous to deal with the question in a new, 
consolidated co-operative act, or else all that has to be done is to take over the 
relevant provisions of the Civil Code, and insert them in the new consolidated 
co-operative act. Still no matter whether or not a new co-operative act brings 
under regulation these general theses of co-operative property, it is certain that 
without these provisions the Civil Code would be incomplete, so that these had 
to be incorporated in it in one way or an other, and as far as this author knows 
there is general agreement on this question.
All this even indicates by itself that when in connexion with the drafting 
of the new co-operative act the problem of a definition of the general theses of 
co-operative property will emerge, the legislator should preferably set out from 
the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on his path to a solution. Here the 
basic issue to which a reply has to be given is whether or not the general rules 
of the Civil Code applying to co-operative property may be observed under the 
conditions of the new method of economic management. As a matter of fact 
when these provisions cannot be met wholly, or at least in certain respects, 
then it would be hardly proper and justified to omit in the new co-operative 
act a new regulation satisfying the needs of today and of development in the 
foreseeable future.
a) As is obvious from the rules governing social ownership as well as from 
the preamble, the Civil Code considers social group ownership a uniform cate­
gory of ownership, of which a typical self-contained form is co-operative group 
ownership, so that the rules governing this ownership are normative, also for 
any other form of manifestation of group ownership. At the time the Civil Code 
was drafted, in particular because at that time the country was living in the 
period of a centralized economic mechanism and the mass collectivization of 
agriculture was still to come, a regulation of this type on the whole suited the 
forms of group ownership as known at that time.
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However, the category of social group ownership began to develop on a 
large scale exactly on the promulgation of the Civil Code, in the first place 
when mass collectivization of agriculture was about to come to an end. The 
new economic mechanism on its part again gave an impetus to the evolution 
of the category of social group ownership. This still incomplete process of 
evolution is at present at a stage where a whole system of social group ownership 
is about to unfold, and, to be more precise, as an integral part of the socialist 
system of ownership of this country.
With the evolution of the system of social group ownership it has become 
even more obvious that there is not only a single type of social group ownership. 
In fact social group ownership must not necessarily exist in the structure which 
has been embodied typically by co-operative group ownership. Beyond this 
there may exist and even exist also other types of social group property, and in 
principle yet others may come into being.
These various forms of social group ownership, including also co-operative 
group ownership, can and do possess certain general, common features, which 
may equally be discovered in any form of group ownership. However, it cannot 
be taken for granted at all that these general and common features are identical 
with the general and common features which are characteristic of co-operative 
group ownership. And when the fact is remembered that in Hungary during the 
latter years a system of co-operative ownership has taken shape, which by 
itself is difficult to survey and consequently not even the general rules of this 
system of ownership can be established, then it stands to reason that the pro­
visions of the Civil Code relating to co-operative group ownership can no longer 
be considered as the general rules of group ownership and, consequently, as 
normative for other manifestation forms of group ownersliip. Or to be more 
precise: these rules may be normative to a lesser or greater degree, however, 
they will fail even as general rules of group ownership to satisfy the demands 
which in general are forthcoming from the field of group ownership.
However, from this reasoning the only lesson which may be drawn directly 
is that when all this holds then an amendment of the Civil Code will have to 
consider in what form the Civil Code should formulate the general rules of 
social group ownership. May such general and common rules be incorporated in 
the Civil Code at all, or would the proper course be to group and generalize 
such common rules by the conceivable categories of social group ownership ?
h) Apart from what has been set forth above, the provisions of the Civil Code 
applying to co-operative ownership may still be valid in principle as far as the 
largest category of social group ownership, i. e. co-operative group ownership is 
concerned. This is even more obvious since the general rules of co-operative 
ownership drawn up with this end in view have only been projected to other 
forms of social group ownership. Hence even if this projection of rules in this 
form should fail to satisfy the needs, they may nevertheless be suitable for the 
direct purpose for which they have been made, i. e. they may still remain valid as 
the general rules of co-operative ownership.
Summing up all this, the conclusion will be inevitable that in the present 
phase of development the general rules of the Civil Code governing co-operative 
ownership can be applied to co-operative ownership less and less and in their 
broad outlines only. This is the case before all for two reasons of a fundamental 
character, namely partly because the new system of economic management
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has, as compared to the earlier, brought about certain changes in the socialist 
approach to ownership, partly because the new, general co-operative policy 
has, as compared to the earlier, introduced changes in the structure of agri­
cultural co-operatives and in their system of regional federations, which 
supersede the general provisions of the Civil Code on co-operative ownership 
on the one part and yet more distinctly betray the lack of rules which could help 
to advance co-operative ownership in the period of the new method of economic 
management on the other.
The rules of the Civil Code according to their sense reflect the socialist 
ownership approach that was basically characteristic of the centralized system 
of the economic mechanism. This is the case because ten years ago when the 
Civil Code was ready for promulgation, in Hungary socialism was built in the 
system of a centralized economic mechanism. I t has to be recognized that the 
provisions of the Civil Code on ownership already impress one as if the approach 
to social ownership could not be anymore so rigid as it was e. g. in the opening 
years of the fifties. Since in the agricultural co-operative movement the premo­
nitory signs of the advent of a new economic mechanism could already been 
discerned, this circumstance may have had an effect in so far as the provisions 
of the Civil Code governing ownership give expression to the socialist ownership 
approach characteristic of the period of a centralized economic mechanism in a 
more or less mitigated form.
What was the essence of this approach to ownership ? In the opinion of this 
author the essence was partly a “simplified” approach to social ownership, 
partly the distortion of this approach in both theory and practice.
The simplification of the approach to social ownership manifested itself 
essentially in the circumstance that in general notionally only the categories of 
state-social and co-operative-social ownership were considered, and these 
two basic categories of ownership were made exclusive in both theory and 
practice. Even when occasionally it occurred to those concerned that social 
ownership might have, and even had, other forms in Hungary, the question 
was brushed aside with the remark that law decreed the application of the rules 
of either the one or the other basic category of social ownership to all other 
forms of social ownerchip constituting a “third category”.
This simplification went on in the distortion of the ownership approach. 
The distortions, in whatever form they had manifested themselves, may be 
traced back essentially to the position which drew an unjustifiably sharp line 
between the two forms of social ownership much for the benefit of state-social 
ownership. This position gave prominence to state-social ownership to the 
prejudice of co-operative-social ownership, i. e. emphasis was given to state- 
social ownership in a way which at the same time amounted to the degradation 
of co-operative ownership to “second-class” social ownership. In practice, in a 
system of a centralized economic mechanism, this resulted in the extension of a 
state-centred mechanism based on state-social ownership so to say in an unchan­
ged form among others to the sector of the national economy relying on co-opera­
tive ownership.
Naturally an ownership approach of this type could take shape only in a 
way that state social ownership itself in a rather one-sided form was handled in 
a so-called “state-centred” mind. On the other hand, in principle, co-operative 
ownership existed as group ownership, in particular in the case of agricultural
72  I .  S E R E S
co-operative ownership. Still the earlier mechanism tried to operate this co­
operative social group ownership essentially in the same way as the state- 
centred state-social ownership, which nationally turned the group ownership 
character of co-operative-social ownership into something formal. From another 
aspect this at the same time also meant that for each form of co-operative group 
ownership in a small way the same interpretation developed as on a large 
scale in the case of state ownership. A phenomenon of this type could be noticed 
in particular in the case of farmers’ co-operative ownership, where in point of 
fact co-operative ownership did not manifest itself as the group ownership of 
each farmers’ co-operative, but as the ownership of a network of farmers’ 
co-operatives, i. e. so to say as centralized ownership, where the particular 
farmers’ co-operative units were stewards of the co-operative assets managed 
by them, rather than direct owners. This was of course possible only because the 
National Association of Co-operatives (SZÜVOSZ) was a co-operative centre 
built on the principle of centralization, which to a considerable extent operated 
in practice like a department of economy.
In other words all this meant that the farmers’ co-operative ownership, 
referred to by way of example, in a small way operated according to a „SZÖ- 
VOSZ”-centred notion similarly to the state-centred notion according to which 
state social ownership existed, on a large scale, so that in this related concept 
the two could not anymore be alien to each other in the system of a centralized 
economic mechanism.
To this it should be added that in the system of the earlier mechanism any 
form of co-operative group property could have coped with the hardships only 
on a principle which, in the sign of autonomous management and economic 
independence was about to take shape at that time. Consequently the dominant 
approach to ownership understandably had repercussions also on co-operative 
group ownership, which on the whole was responsible for the failure of the bene- • 
fits and undoubtedly best properties of the construction of co-operative social 
group ownership to unfold themselves in Hungary in both legislation and the 
enforcement of law, notwithstanding the fact that in both theory and in the 
statutory provisions constant stress was laid on the group ownership character 
of all existing forms of co-operative ownership.
c) On reverting to the provisions of the Civil Code applying to social 
ownership, the statement may be brought forward that against co-operative 
ownership, and at the same time to its prejudice, even the Civil Code gave 
prominence to state-social ownership with all its legal consequences.
This fact by itself gives prominence to the rather essential demand that in 
the course of a restatement of the Civil Code, as well as in a possible new co­
operative act, the provisions governing ownership have to be formulated and 
regulated on uniform principles for the various forms of social ownership.
And here uniform basic principles before all suggest that in both legislation 
and the enforcement of law the principle of the equal rights of the forms of 
social ownership must be observed.
The principle of the equal rights of the forms of socialist social ownership 
raises a number of important questions all of which we cannot deal with here. 
However, from the point of view of the present topic the principle of the equa­
lity of rights has to be studied from two aspects in any event, viz. partly in 
general in the mutual relations of co-operative ownership and state-social
O N  C O -O P E R A T IV E  P R O P E R T Y  73
ownership, partly within the whole system or co-operative ownership, i. e. in 
the mutual relations of the particular forms of co-operative ownership.
When it comes to study the problem of the equality of rights of state-social 
ownership and co-operative ownership, the start should be from the assump­
tion of the uniformity of the various forms of co-operative ownership, i. e. in 
an abstract form here the question is of the mutual relations or equality of 
rights of co-operative ownership as group ownership and state-social ownership 
as “all-national” ownership.
Earlier, if schematically only, we have tried to make clear where an une­
quality of rights of the two types of social ownership would lead to, and why. 
On the other hand, in contrast to the earlier mechanism, in the new system of 
economic management a wide scope has been opened in both state and co-opera­
tive sectors to economic autonomy, and to the independent management of the 
producing and farming collectives; i. e. in the abstract, the intention is to offer 
equal chances to the various economic units in a way tha t each unit relying on 
its own resources and labour force, etc. manages its affairs at its own risks and 
achieves as favourable results as possible, which through many stages would 
eventually redound to its benefit. This approach to economy from the very 
outset relies on a legally highest degree of equality of the various economic 
units. In fact these units are integral parts of a socialist economy constituting a 
concrete, coherent system, where the parts mutually presuppose one another. 
For tha t matter the legally possible highest degree of equality of the economic 
units is a phenomenon of extreme complexity.
The cardinal problem of the legal equality of socialist economic units is the 
equality of ownership, or more precisely, the demand that co-operative social 
group ownership should not be at a disadvantage in opposition to state-social 
ownership. The enforcement of the equality of these two forms of social owner­
ship does not mean, and cannot mean, that the provisions governing them 
should bo uniform in every respect. A case of uniform regulation талг be present 
only if both co-operative and state ownership were recognized as group owner- 
ship of uniform structure. However, in Hungarian jurisprudence a theoretical 
approach to ownership on this understanding has not developed, and what is 
even more decisive, the evolution of economic life itself has not furnished a 
proper basis in Hungary for the recognition of any form of social ownership as 
some sort of a more or less uniform group ownership.
On the other hand, for either form of social ownership the provisions 
governing ownership have to offer equal chances in the field of economy in a 
way and in the form as permitted by the given structure of social ownership 
without, however, to the prejudice of either form. Or, expressed in a simpler 
form, here the case is that the regulation of the two types of social ownership 
should not take place in a a manner of placing the one type above the other, or 
to the prejudice of either, but rather so as to prompt them to mutual aid, or to 
the wholesome development of their mutual relations. All this is feasible without 
a risk of co-operative ownership losing its co-operative and group character, 
or without pushing it to the background in any form. Similarly, state social 
ownership will not on the whole have to be converted into co-operative owners­
hip.
All this has been said merely to convey an idea of the sense in which the 
equality of the two types of social ownership could be brought about. In this
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connexion it should be pointed out that in all likelihood, under the circumstan­
ces of the new system of economic management, the enforcement of the prin­
ciple of the equality of the two types of social ownership is desirable not only on 
the part of co-operative ownership, but also on the part of state-social owners­
hip. I t  is desirable also because actual management,!, e. so-called enterprisal 
management relying on state ownership also takes place on a “group level” 
similarly to co-operative management, and so both state and co-operative 
enterprisal management in conjunction create the uniform system of present 
socialist management on the same level. And objectively such a uniform 
system of socialist management can be built up only on the principle of an 
equality of the forms of social ownership.
Still the enforcement of the principle of the equality of the forms of social 
ownership is required not only in the mutual relations of heterogeneous (state 
and co-operative) forms of social ownership, but also beyond this in the mutual 
relations of homogeneous (co-operative) forms of social ownership. At the first 
glance the raising of the question may appear to be unnecessary, this being a 
truism, i. e. something that could not be argued for a moment even.
But the problem has to be dealt with merely because during the past 
period of the Hungarian socialist co-operative movement the equality of the 
various formes of co-operative ownership was neither in theory nor in practice a 
clear-cut, natural phenomenon. In the first place the question is perhaps not 
even one of the failure of the Civil Code to formulate the general provisions 
governing cooperative ownership by relying on this basic principle, but rather 
one of its failure to give expression to this equality of the various forms of 
co-operative ownership, and thus willy-nilly advanced the formation of a 
notion and practice defeating this principle.
We believe we may dispense with adducing spetial proof to demonstrate 
that the form of co-operative ownership which existed consolidated into a 
system of a co-operative centre and which was supported by a centre which 
towards its member co-operatives performed considerable state supervisory and 
official activities, was considered from an unbiassed point of view being in an 
economic and legal position by far superior to the form of co-operative owners­
hip which had no federal organization or a centre, where the particular sub­
jects of co-operative group ownership managed their affairs in a manner segre­
gated from one another, and for which any official business was attended to by 
the competent agencies of the sovereign power and state administration. For the 
former a typical example in Hungary was the farmers’ co-operative property 
consolidated into a system of a co-operative centre by SZ0VOSZ where the 
agricultural producing co-operatives had no system of federation whatever 
until the new system of economic management began to unfold itself.
However, this duality in the field of co-operative ownership, a feature of 
the Hungarian co-operative movement, not only manifested itself in the scope 
of federal organization and in other scopes closely related to it, but affected 
co-operative ownership more or less so to say in every field. To quote a single 
example only in this connexion the particularly prejudicial position of agri­
cultural co-operatives may be pointed out. Although these co-operatives had 
juristic personality, nevertheless their sphere of activities and their legal capa­
city attached to this spehere were in the earlier system of economic manage­
ment circumscribed with a rigour, and so also the substantive sphere of co­
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operative ownership, which was unjustified even by a narrowest construction 
of the scope of activities of agricultural co-operatives. I t may suffice to mention 
that for a long time no large farming machinery could be owned by agricultural 
co-operatives, although this was a precondition of modern large-scale farming. 
In the same manner, for a long time agricultural co-operatives could not be 
owners of land, although in Hungary land was not, and is not even at present, 
uniformly in state ownership.
Examples may still be quoted for both the objects of ownership and the 
content of ownership. These examples could but substantiate the general sta­
tement that in Hungary among the various forms of co-operative ownership the 
principle of equality of rights never prevailed, even when it was a case of social 
group ownership forms belonging to a single group.
From what has been set forth so far the conclusion of general validity 
may be drawn that in both the theory of ownership and in recent legislation and 
the enforcement of law the thesis will have to be enforced, that in the new 
system of economic management the principle of a general equality of the forms 
of socialist social ownership has to prevail.
The principle of the general equality of the forms of socialist social owner­
ship must not in any case be identified with the functions which the various 
forms of social ownership perform in socialist economic and social life. I t  is a well 
known fact that in Hungarian economic and social life state-social ownership 
has a fundamental function and only secondarily there may be talk of the func­
tion and significance of any degree of the various forms of co-operative owner­
ship. Naturally the present function and weight of the forms of social ownership 
are not given once for all. While the function of certain forms of social owner­
ship are in the ascendant, that of others persists in its present significance 
for sustained periods. Again the functions of yet other forms are declining as 
required by socialist evolution. However, this evolution of the various forms of 
social ownership goes on abreast, or in mutual correlation of the forms, still so 
that this evolution does not insist on, moreover is averse to, the one form getting 
into a preferential legal position, and so to a preferential economic position, to 
the prejudice of another. In the Hungarian system of ownership each form of 
social ownership carries with it the potentialities of evolution, and when on the 
basis of the principle of equality a path is thrown open to this evolution in 
building up socialism, there may hardly be need for buttressing up the one form 
to the prejudice of another.
2. There is always a definite interaction between management and owner­
ship. In the present socialist conditions, socialist management has a determi­
ning function in this interrelation. In this respect the determining function of 
socialist management means that there has to be a proper harmony between 
management and its underlying ownership relations. Still when this harmony is 
wanting, or incomplete, and consequently satisfies the interests of management 
in a deficient manner, or not at all, a harmony as required by the interests of 
socilaist management has to be brought about between ownership and manage­
ment. This harmony of vital importance cannot be brought about unless by an 
adaptation of ownership to socialist management in one proper form or another, 
or to be more precise, preferably in a form which does not merely give a free 
scope to, but at the same time also advances, the growth of the socialist eco­
nomy.
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The existence of a harmony between economy and its underlying property 
relations is an objective necessity which sooner or later, still in one form or an 
other, will in all circumstances become a reality. I t is also a well-known fact 
that ownership in the economic sense adapts itself with particular readiness to 
economy, follows at a quick pace economic growth, and meets the needs raised 
by this growth.
On the other hand this cannot be said of ownership without reservations. 
Movement, or change of ownership is by far more numerous than the adapta­
tion of property in the economic sense. This does not, however, necessarily 
mean that ownership will always and in each case be lagging behind, and follow 
in the wake of economic evolution in a protracted manner. This lagging behind 
of ownership is in particular not characteristic of the socilaist system of owner­
ship. As a matter of fact, in principle the socialist system of ownership exists in 
forms of ownership which in point of principle satisfy the needs of economy for 
the whole period of socialism, i. e. the socialist system is in principle and on 
the whole in harmony with economy.
However, in reality the situation is by far not so clear-cut. I t is not clear- 
cut because when only social ownership is considered socialist social ownersliip 
has many forms, a circumstance which by itself introduces complexities into 
the practical realization of a harmony between economy and ownersliip. Fur­
thermore the situation is far from being a plain one merely because each type of 
socialist social ownersliip may be given different constructions. Consequently 
when the given socialist social property is conceived in a sense which is not in 
harmony with the postulates of socialist economy, a contradiction will spring 
up between the apparently homogeneous economy and ownership which will 
retard economic growth. An immanent contradiction of this nature has to be 
overcome without a change of the character of ownership and economy still in 
a way that ownership should though in the same framework yet all the same, be 
adapted to economy.
A typical example which may be quoted here is the economy of state enter­
prises and state social ownership. Both state social ownership and the economy 
of state enterprises are of a socialist character, i. e. in this sense there is in 
principle a harmony between economy and ownership. On the other hand if it is 
remembered that in the new system of economic management the economic 
independence of the state enterprises has been widened considerably, still at the 
same time state social property is handled in a state-centric notion reminding 
of the period of the earlier mechanism, there will already be a contradiction 
between economy and ownership. There will be a contradiction for the very 
reason that the state-centric notion of state social ownership and the rules 
formulated in conformity with this notion will retard the evolution of the 
economic independence of state enterprises. Hence this contradiction cannot be 
removed unless by forgoing the state-centric notion of state social ownership 
and by the formulation of a notion of state social ownership which gives expres­
sion to, and at the same time meets the needs of, the economy of state enter­
prises in the new system of economic management.
a) In the case of co-operative economy the unity of economy and ownership 
is likewise a basic principle, and so also a proper harmony between ownership 
and economy doing justice to the interests of co-operative economy.
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There is a number of interpretations for the harmony between economy 
and ownership in tho co-operatives. In point of fact, in the scope of co-operative 
economy this harmony raises by far more problems than e. g. in the relations 
between state social ownership and the economy of state enterprises. There are 
many more problems to be solved, first because co-operative economy in gene­
ral gradually supersedes production on a small scale, and this gradualness from 
the very outset implies that in the scope of co-operative economy the harmony 
between ownership and economy has to be construed and handled with extreme 
elasticity. Secondly, the variegated character of co-operative ownership and 
economy, the given construction of co-operative group ownership, and its 
notion, permit the application of a number of variants even within the same 
system of economic management. Here again as an example the farmers’ co­
operative and agricultural co-operative ownership in the system of a centralized 
economic mechanism may be quoted, where the farmers’ co-operatives were 
managed on the basis of co-operative ownership of a SZŐ VOSZ-centric notion 
consolidated into a centre, whereas management of the agricultural co-operati­
ves was carried out on the basis of isolated co-operative group ownership, 
not to mention the fact that the fundamental means of production of agri­
culture (land and large agricultural machinery) were not owned by co-operati­
ves.
The fact that in socialism co-operative economy has come into being 
partly in the place of small-scale production (agricultural and artisans’ co­
operatives), partly along with individual and personal business in a manner 
supplementing tins (general consumers’ and marketing co-operatives, housing 
co-operatives, savings co-operatives), then later on, when the foundations of 
socialism had already been laid, the association of socialist economic units 
began to make headway, has necessarily become responsible for a differentia­
tion in the establishment of the unity of economy and ownership in the case 
of the particular forms of co-operatives. A definite phase of evolution had to 
lapse until in each co-operative form the direct harmony between ownership 
and economy could be enforced in a uniform manner.
At the birth of the co-operatives, i. e. at the start, a direct harmony bet­
ween economy and ownership can be discovered to the least degree in the agri­
cultural co-operatives. In point of fact, in the first phase of evolution of the 
producer’s co-operatives, i. e. essentially before mass collectivization had been 
completed, exactly the basic means of production of agriculture, i. e. land and 
large farming machinery, were not, and could not even be, in the ownership of 
the agricultural co-operatives. In this phase the direct unity of economy and 
ownership and their harmony were supplemented in the agricultural co-operati­
ves by the harmony and the direct unity of economy and the joint assets of the 
co-operatives. Hence in this phase of evolution the joint assets of the co-opera­
tives appeared undoubtedly as an “ownership-substituting” institution. Howe­
ver, in the following phase a process set in as the outcome of which joint co-ope­
rative assets to the greater extent passed over into the ownership of the co­
operative, i. e. in the first place large farming machinery, however, gradually 
also land, were transferred into co-operative ownership. Still until this process 
has come to an end, the notion of joint co-operative assets has to be preserved 
in the co-operatives in both the economic and legal sense as an “ownership- 
substituting” institution, and its significance will cease, or dwindle to a mini-
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mum, only when it will be superseded by co-operative ownership both economi­
cally and legally.
On the other hand, in non-producing types of co-operatives in general on 
the whole the unity of economy and ownership has become a reality. In fact, 
even when this unity is the product of an evolution over a period of some length, 
this will be of secondary importance only.
Still the federation of socialist economic units already at the outset creates 
the direct socialist harmony of economy and ownership (e. g. in the case of joint 
enterprises of agricultural co-operatives).
On the whole this is an indication of that in Hungary in the co-operatives, 
in particular in the agricultural co-operatives, the creation of a unity of eco­
nomy and ownership was a prolonged process. I t  is true though tha t under 
conditions in Hungary already when mass collectivization came to an end, and 
with the launching of the new system of economic management, within legally 
regulated frameworks, rapid progress received a new impetus also within the 
producing co-operatives as the outcome of which joint co-operative assets on 
the whole began adapt themselves even legally to a joint co-operative economy. 
Consequently within a reasonable time even in the agricultural co-operatives 
the direct harmony of economy and ownership will become a fact in its enti­
rety.
On this understanding the general conclusion may be drawn that in the 
event of a regulation of the conditions of the various co-operatives by the intro­
duction of a uniform co-operative act thedetailed provisions governing economy, 
assets and property could be formulated uniformly as a principal rule extending 
to all forms of co-operatives on the basic principle that in the co-operatives 
the harmony of economy and ownership exists on a group ownership level.
However, in this connexion special emphasis has to be given to the epithet 
“direct”. In this case the adjective “direct” wants to signify that the assets 
on which economy relies is owned by those who directly manage these assets. 
Consequently the assets constituting the basis of the operations of agricultural 
co-operatives are owned by them, similarly as the assets on which the operations 
of a general purchasing and marketing co-operative relies are owned by thsi 
co-operative, and so on. In the same way the assets constituting the basis of 
the operations of joint enterprises (economic associations) of agricultural 
co-operatives will be in the ownership of the joint enterprise. This directness 
of the harmony of economy and ownership is what mostly promotes the deve­
lopment of the socialist economy in the system of the new economic mecha­
nism in the co-operative sector of economy, and therefore both economically 
and legally all efforts have to be made for a most perfect enforcement of this 
harmony.
However, in the co-operatives this unity of economy and ownership must 
not be absolutized. This principal rule must not be absolutized in a sense as 
if co-operative economy could rely exclusively on co-operative social owner­
ship. A conclusion in this sense would be unfounded under socialist conditions 
even historically, and when future development is kept in sight, this conclusion 
ought to be rejected. Co-operative economy is an integral part of the socialist 
system of economy, which according to its meaning means to say tha t even 
when on the whole co-operative economy in the first place relies on co-operative 
ownership, in a co-operative economy in the one sense or the other, directly or
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indirectly, all forms of socialist ownership (often even private property) may, 
and do have a function.
Apart from the fact that historically this can be demonstrated in an illus­
trative form mainly in the agricultural co-operative economy, even the present 
situation of co-operative economy in a clear-cut manner tends to confirm that 
on the whole co-operatives would be unable to operate if in their economy they 
could not rely in the first place on state-social ownership, further in areciprocal 
way on the various forms of co-operative ownership, and by no means to a 
negligible extent on personal ownership. In the joint operations of agricultural 
co-operatives within the totality of the co-operatives’ joint assets even today 
the assets owned by the state, the property of the members of the co-operative, 
and occasionally even property of persons outside the co-operative may have im­
portant functions to perform. In this form all these take part directly in the 
joint operations of the co-operatives. However, state-social ownership also has 
indirectly significant functions in the joint operations of the co-opex*atives, e. g. 
through the banking system, soil improvement schemes, and in many other 
forms. Still as an example the housing co-operatives may be quoted, in whose 
creation as well as in the creation and operation of joint ownership and perso­
nal ownership co-ordinated through joint ownership, state-social ownership has 
fundamental functions. In fact, essentially the state advances the funds neces­
sary for the formation of a housing co-operative almost in their entirety and 
free of interest in a way that the state even undertakes construction wox'k, so 
that the housing co-operative acquires the assets of the co-operative in a con­
dition ready for operation.
These facts on their part call the attention to the circumstance that in the 
co-operatives the unity of economy and ownership must not be handled in an 
isolated form, but as a principal rule, which increasingly affords chances to 
co-operative economy of an organic integration into the system of socialist 
economy, and that on the principle of the equality of the socialist economic 
units the co-operatives prosper so as to advance the development of a socialist 
economic and social system in both the co-operatives and the national economy 
as a whole.
3. The direct harmony of co-operative economy and co-opei'ative owner­
ship from the very outset postulates the group ownership character of co-opera­
tive ownership. Or in other words, co-operative ownership cannot be in complete 
and direct harmony with co-operative economy, unless on a group ownership 
level of co-opex’ative ownership.
However, experience accumulated in the course of the historical evolution 
of the socialist co-operative movement indicate that in a given socialist state 
the system of co-operative ownership may exist in a number of structures. 
Even when it is assumed that in a given socialist state state-social ownership is 
predominant, like e. g. in Hungary, the system of socialist co-operative owner­
ship is conceivable at least in a duality of structures.
One of these possible structures is that of the system of centralized co­
operative ownership. In  this sti’ueture, in the co-operative network of the given 
type, the network itself, or rather its centre, is the owner, and the member 
co-operatives belonging to the network essentially operate as trustees and eco­
nomic units on the basis of an economic independence of a definite form. As a 
matter of fact this structure and notion of co-operative ownership is in respect
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of the given co-operative network the enforcement of the notion on a small 
scale, which is characteristic of the state-centric concept a t state-social owners­
hip and an economy relying on it.
This concept and structure of co-operative ownership can on the whole 
prevail only in a system of centralized economic mechanism, with the addition 
that not even there for all forms of co-operative ownership. In this sphere 
experience tends to confirm that in a system of a centralized economic mecha­
nism in general the non-producing types of co-operatives manage their business 
on this basis, still the producing types of co-operatives will even under such 
circumstances operate on a direct group ownership level, i. e. producing co­
operative ownership will in general exist in a non-centralized structure. Perhaps 
we may dispense with demonstrating that this centralized notion and structure 
of co-operative ownership is essentially alien to the group ownership character 
of co-operative ownership, beacuse it estranges ownership from the actual 
owners, i. e. from the co-operative members and the co-operating economic 
units, i. e. the member co-operatives, and degrades these direct owners to 
simple trustees.
In a centralized co-operative system the co-operative centre, as the embo­
diment of the given network of co-operatives, is a passive and not an active 
owner. In fact it is not the centre that manages business directly, but the mem­
ber co-operatives, although it cannot be ignored completely that in this case 
the centre will interfere with the operations of the member co-operatives.
At the same time in the event of centralized co-operative ownership not 
even the actually operating particular member co-operatives may consider 
themselves fully qualified owners of the assets in their management, because 
these assets are legally in the ownership of the centre, or through this centre, of 
the network of co-operatives as a whole. All this demonstrates that centralized 
co-operative ownership has ceased to be typical group ownership, although it 
cannot be considered all-national ownership.
Still it would be wrong to draw a general conclusion as if any integration 
were alien to co-operative group ownership, or the co-operative centre could not 
become the subject of co-operative ownership, moreover the actual trends in 
evolution gradually bring about the integration of co-operative farms, a co­
ordination of the operations of co-operatives on an expanding scale, the deve­
lopment of systems for protecting mutual interests, etc. Still all this is feasible 
in a form not alien to co-operative group ownership, i. e. the different forms have 
to crop up from co-operative group ownership in a way that harmony between 
co-operative economy and co-operative ownership should prevail, no matter 
whether directly or indirectly.
Another possible structure of co-operative ownership is the democratic 
system of co-operative ownership. In the democratic system of co-operative 
ownership the co-operatives are direct owners of the property which they 
manage. In this system both the member co-operatives and the units of the 
co-operative federations of the given type of co-operative manage their affairs 
autonomously, on the basis of separated own property. Hence in this system 
of co-operative ownership there is direct harmony between co-operative eco­
nomy and co-operative ownership, which on the part of ownership indicates that 
this co-operative ownership functions typically as social group ownership.
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In the democratic system of co-operative ownership, co-operative group 
ownership is in all cases active ownership, because in a co-operative as a juristic 
person the actual manager of property and the owner coincide.
By virtue of its nature, the new system of economic management, as re­
gards co-operative ownership, insists on the democratic system of co-operative 
ownerchip, and this is so not only for the producing forms of co-operatives, but 
in general for the network of socialist co-operatives as a whole. I t is for this 
reason that the development of the uniformly democratic system of co-operative 
ownership has been put on the agenda similarly as earlier in the case of the 
legally already regulated agricultural co-operatives.
I t  has already been indicated that although co-operative ownership is 
typically group ownership, the process of integration is by no means alien to it, 
and for that matter a process of integration which sets out from below, from co- 
operative-social group ownership itself. Accordingly, even for the democratic 
co-operative-social group ownership system the process of integration is not 
something unusual, still in this system, in contrast to the centralized system of 
co-operative ownership, the process of integration proceeds from below upwards, 
and not from above downwards, i. e. co-operative group ownership is not centra­
lized by way of subordination.
In the democratic system of co-operative ownership the process of integ­
ration essentially goes on in a way that as the outcome co-operative group 
ownership will not be wound up, on the contrary, it will be consolidated. On 
whatever level integration will be completed in this system, co-operative owner­
ship will preserve its group ownership character on the given level, and conse­
quently in a co-operative economy on the integrated level the direct unity of 
economy and ownership will prevail, and in a way characteristic of a co-opera­
tive economy.
Consequently it is an organic feature of the democratic system of co­
operative ownership that
a)  the regional federations and the national federation of the co-operative 
sector should have co-operative group property of their own;
in an economic association created by two co-operatives or more, 
operations, should be on the basis of co-operative joint group ownership;
c) in the economic associations created by co-operatives and state enter­
prises, operations should rely on mixed social common group ownership of co­
operative character; and finally
d) it is part and parcel of the democratic system of co-operative ownership 
that all member co-operatives joined in the branch-co-operative regional 
federation, or in the national federation, should bring about co-operative pro­
perty of which all member co-operative are owners.
If the term inter-co-operative ownership is in general maintained for the 
description of the property of co-operative joint enterprises and undertakings, 
or of associations, then property which the federations of co-operatives manage 
as the joint property of the member co-operatives belonging to the federation, 
and not as group property of their own, should for a better differentiation 
perhaps be distinguished by the term “co-operative community property.“
Since co-operative joint (mixed) ownership will be discussed in detail 
subsequently, here the above cases have been named merely by way of example 
to demonstrate that in the present phase of economic development the integ-
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ration of co-operative ownership in harmony with the integration of co-opera­
tive economy is a natural concomitant of the democratis system of co-operative 
ownership.
However, it is characteristic of this process that as concerns management 
both inter-co-operative property and co-operative community property are 
concentrated in a single hand, i. e. a single agency (enterprise or federal organi­
zation) attends to their utilization. Hence the property cannot be split up 
among the particular member co-operatives, joint owners or other economic 
units for exploitation. All this finds an expression also in ownership rights, in a 
form that in external ownership relations the agency exploiting the property 
will appear as owner, i. e. the direct owner is the inter-co-operative association 
(joint enterprise, joint venture) itself, or the given co-operative federal organiza­
tion, whereas the joint-owner co-operatives or the member co-operatives of the 
federal organization creating the association will act as indirect owners only.
All this has been laid down in an unambiguous form in Act III  of 1967 on 
Agricultural Co-operatives according to which the joint venture or co-operative 
joint enterprise in the joint property of the founders and of those joining it 
subsequently (indirect owners), but the assets of the joint venture, or the 
co-operative joint enterprise, are in the ownership of the venture or enterprise 
(direct owners). Hence the joint co-operative concern or co-operative joint 
enterprise may simultaneously appear as both object and subject of co-operative 
ownership, namely in the relations between indirect and direct owners as the 
object of ownership (but it may also act as a contractual partner, etc.) whereas 
in the external relations of ownership the direct owner takes parts as subject 
of ownership in his own name, i. e. acts as the subject of ownership.
In our opinion there would hardly be another legal construction which 
for inter-co-operative or co-operative community ownership would guarantee 
the direct harmony of co-operative management and property, i. e. the basic 
feature of a co-operative economy.
Finally, in connexion with both inter-co-operative and co-operative joint 
property it should also be remembered that the fact that e. g. inter-co-operative 
property may be split up among the indirect owners by their proprietary 
share, does not affect the co-operative-social group property character of these 
associations.
4. Divisibility or indivisibility of property is an essential point of principle, 
at the same time of practical importance, of social group property in general, 
and in particular of co-operative social group property. I t  is a vital problem 
also for the bery reason that in capitalism the co-operative movement applied 
the principle of divisible co-operative property as the basic rule. In socialism 
indivisible co-operative property has come into being firstof all, but the socialist 
co-operative movement also uses divisible co-operative property, in particular 
in the process of integration of the co-operative economy.
Under socialist conditions divisibility or indivisibility of co-operative 
property is basically dependent on the way how the co-operative has been for­
med and how it operates. In general this means that when the co-operative 
has been formed on a personal basis, i. e. when the co-operative is exclusively a 
personal (labour force) association for common work, joint transactions, or 
when it has been created on a personal and financial basis, i. e. the co-opera­
tive members tie down their full working capacity for the purposes of co-opera-
O N  C O -O P E R A T IV E  P R O P E R T Y  8 3
6 *
tivo management and in addition they socialize their possible private property 
in excess of their personal property in the co-operative, then as a principal rule 
co-operative property so created and augmented should be deemed to be indi­
visible. On the other hand when the co-operative has been brought about 
exclusively, or in the first place, on a financial basis and the personal associa­
tion is of secondary significance only, then the co-operative property so created 
and augmented should be deemed to be divisible. However, it is possible in 
principle that the co-operative property brought about exclusively, or in the 
first place, on a financial basis may become indivisible co-operative property 
if this is the intention of the parties. A typical example for this case in the 
Hungarian system of co-operative ownership the so-called co-operative com­
munity property, i. e. a form of property brought about exclusively on a finan­
cial basis, yet whose basic feature is its indivisibility. (Co-operative community 
property is, e. g. a mutual assistance fund created in the given co-operative 
branch, accumulated from the payments of the member co-operatives and other 
sources, whose owners are the member co-operatives belonging to the given 
co-operative branch.)
In principle cases may occur when co-operative property, irrespective of 
whether it has its origin in an association of physical persons, or the pooling of 
assets, may exist as partly divisible, partly indivisible co-operative property. 
For the purpose of divisibility this category of co-operative property is regarded 
as “partially divisible co-operative property”. I t is partially divisible, and not 
partially indivisible, because in the socialist co-operative system indivisible 
co-operative property will hardly change into even partially divisible co-opera­
tive property, whereas at a certain stage of development, and to some extent, 
divisible co-operative property may often become indivisible. Therefore for 
reasons of accuracy the term partially divisible co-operative property should be 
preferred.
(Although we do not intend to deal with the concrete manifestations of the 
divisibility or indivisibility of particular categories of co-operative property 
in any detail, a peculiarly indivisible category of co-operative property has to 
be mentioned here, namely the property of housing co-operatives. As is known, 
joint co-operative property in a housing co-operative is indivisible and consolida­
tes the personal flat-ownership of the co-operative members to such an extent 
that even the right of disposal over personally owned flats is limited and defined 
to a certain extent.)
Whenever under socialist conditions there is a case of creating a definite 
category of co-operative property, then at the formation of the structure of 
this property, it should be born in mind as general policy-making that the 
divisibility of co-operative property must not eventually lead to the creation 
and consolidation of an economy based on private ownership, nor act as a 
revitalizing factor on private property or private economy. On the other hand, 
the divisibility of co-operative property may increase and reinforce personal 
property, or what is of equal importance, in a given instance the divisibility 
of co-operative property may in its entirety serve the growth of co-operative 
group property as far as the co-owner co-operatives are concerned.
From what has been set forth above it follows that where in case of co­
operative property there is a risk of its divisibility to lead back to private 
property and private economy, the indivisible structure of co-operative pro­
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perty should be preferred. On the other hand, when there is no such risk, co­
operative property may be created and operated both in the divisible and the 
indivisible structure. On the basis of present practice even the conclusion may 
be drawn that whenever co-operative joint property is called into existence by 
co-owners as juristic persons, then divisible co-operative property should be 
the rule, except for co-operative community property mentioned earlier, which 
at the very outset has come into being as indivisible co-operative property.
In everyday life it is often not quite clear what is to be understood by the 
divisibility or indivisibility of co-operative property. I t  is not clear in the 
first place for the very reason that in the course of co-operative economic 
operations the divisible or indivisible character of co-operative property is not 
quite perceptible, and it will come into the limelight only when the given co­
operative is about to be wound up.
Without going any deeper into the analysis of this question we believe a 
stress should be laid on the following points:
a) Co-operative property is divisible where in the course of co-operative 
work the co-owners are entitled not only to share in the profits of the co-opera­
tive through work actually performed by them, or to split up the profit propor­
tionately to their shares in the assets of the co-operative, but on their with­
drawal from the co-operative to claim their share in the property of the co-opera­
tive (in kind or in money), or in the event of the liquidation of the co-operative, 
to claim a distribution of any residual net assets of the co-operative by their 
shares in the co-operative property. But as long as the co-operative operates, 
the assets needed for its operation cannot be distributed among the co-owners; 
and when anyone of the co-owners withdraws from the co-operative while it is 
still operating, then the share of such withdrawing member should be disburs­
ed to him without any jeopardy to the further operation of the co-operative. 
In principle this is feasible mostly in a way when the share of the withdrawing 
member is repaid in money by those remaining in the co-operative, or taken 
over by anyone of the co-owners.
b) Co-operative property is indivisible where in the course of co-operative 
operations the co-owners share in the profits of the co-operative according to 
their assets surrendered to the co-operative for exploitation, or according 
to their share in the co-operative. Hence the co-owners cannot claim their share 
in the co-operative assets when for one reason or another they withdraw from 
the co-operative. Nor can the residual assets be distributed among the co-opera­
tive. Any residual sums have to be appropriated for co-operative purposes.
According to established practice in the socialist co-operative movement, 
co-operative property in producing co-operatives is as a principal rule indivi­
sible (indivisible co-operative property), however, even the invested property 
of non-producing co-operatives has to be considered indivisible (partially 
divisible co-operative property). Also the property of the federal organizations 
of co-operatives is indivisible co-operative property, and so is the co-operative 
community property managed by these organizations. On the other hand, in 
general, the property of joint co-operative concerns or joint co-operative enter­
prises is usually divisible (divisible co-operative joint property), although in 
principle also joint co-operative concerns or enterprises are conceivable which 
have been created on the basis of an indivisible co-operative property structure, 
and are operated on this understanding. Co-operative ownership in this sense is
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likely to exist in the event of a joint co-operative concern, or co-operative joint 
enterprise embracing the given co-operative branch a whole, and is even de­
sirable in this case. However, in reality this is but one of the concrete forms of 
manifestation of co-operative community property.
The indivisibility of co-operative property is not a phenomenon existing 
for its own sake. The economic roots of indivisibility have to be sought for in 
the evolution of the productive forces and production relations. Under socialist 
conditions social production is associated with the social ownership of the basic 
means of production, and this social ownership has to be preserved in the 
interests of the socialist economic and social order. This socialist social character 
of ownership among others finds an expression exactly in the indivisibility of 
co-operative property. This indivisibility guarantees that the basic and prin­
cipal means of production, owned by the co-operative, will remain in social 
ownership also when a given co-operative management comes to an end, and that 
it be in harmony with social production even in this form of ownership.
The indivisibility of co-operative property is directly in the interest of a 
co-operative economy, the group interest of those active in the given co-opera­
tive, and at the same time gives expression to the co-operative group character 
of property. However, the indivisibility of co-operative property will not be 
affected even when the co-operative is liquidated, as the property may be used 
exclusively for co-operative ends even afterwards, before all for ends being 
the same as those of the respective co-operative branch. This means that the 
indivisibility of co-operative property is at the same time an indication of the 
branch-co-operative character of the property. If  for some reason the co-opera­
tive property cannot be appropriated for branch-co-operative ends, even then 
it will have to be used for co-operative ends. On the other hand, this potenti­
ality and obligation of use indicates that in the given instance the indivisibility 
of co-operative property also expresses the all-co-operative character of this 
property. And when the exploitation of this property for co-operative ends is not 
possible, the state will take care of its exploitation in the same way as of the 
exploitation of state property. And this is an indication of the all-national 
character of the property. On the whole, therefore the statement may be advanc­
ed that essentially the indivisibility of co-operative property is but the con­
crete form of manifestation of the all-national character of social property for 
the case of co-operative group property.
5. For any ownership the crucial problem is its object. As regards the 
ownership of juristic persons this problem will come into prominence in an 
increased degree, in particular under socialist conditions, mainly because the 
sphere of objects of the ownership of juristic persons is in the socialist system 
of ownership both externally and intrinsically limited. When, therefore, the 
ownership of other juristic persons is ignored, the sphere of objects of the 
ownership of co-operatives as juristic persons is similarly limited externally 
and intrinsically.
Externally the sphere of objects of co-operative ownership is limited in so 
far as in principle the exclusive objects of state ownership cannot become ob­
jects of co-operative ownership. This thesis will in principle hold its own even 
under actual conditions, still as regards its practical enforcement two things 
have to be remarked. First, in the period of the centralized economic mecha­
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nism the Hungarian theory of ownership gave an unjustifiably extensive con­
struction to the exclusive sphere of objects of state ownership, much to the 
prejudice of co-operative ownership, in particular of tha t of the agricultural 
co-operatives. This attitude was wrong in both principle and practice, and be­
came the origin of a number of errors. (E. g. for a long time, on the basis of this 
wrong construction, the exclusive state ownership of large agricultural machi­
nery was enforced, which according to its meaning runs counter the interests of 
a large-scale operation of the agricultural co-operatives, etc.) Secondly, in the 
period of the new system of economic management the sphere of objects of 
exclusive state ownership will have to be given a narrower construction lest it 
should hamper the statutory operations of the co-operatives. State ownership 
should in its way rather promote the statutory activities of the co-operatives, 
i. e. in this sphere, too, the equality of the forms of social ownership has to be 
enforced in a sense that state social ownership should not enjoy priority to the 
detriment of co-operative ownership. In other words this means that among the 
exclusive objects of state ownership the means of production and equipment re­
quired for co-operative economy may appear only in so far as these permit, and 
at the same time promote, the development of a co-operative economy. How­
ever, when the fundamental rule isremembred that under the circumstances of 
the new system of economic management there has to be a harmony between 
economy and ownership in each economic unit, the first thesis may be formula­
ted in a way to express that actually in the Hungarian system of ownership the 
exclusive objects of state ownership cannot comprise such fundamental means 
of production and equipment as are required for the enforcement of the statu­
tory objectives of the existing co-operatives as juristic persons.
Intrinsically the sphere of objects of co-operative ownership is limited 
owing to the circumstance that co-operatives as juristic persons are tied to 
definite ends. This means that only things can be in the ownership of the co­
operatives which are needed for the achievement of these ends.
This character of the co-operatives as juristic persons manifests itself from 
another aspect as the question of the legal capacity of the co-operative as a 
juristic person. Here, too, the problem of construction is of importance. Con­
struction is of importance because, as shown by experience made so far, the 
legal capacity of the co-operatives can be construed both restrictively and 
extensively. In the system of the centralized economic mechanism, as regards 
the co-operatives in general, the restrictive construction was predominant as 
far as the legal capacity of the co-operative was concerned. This restrictive 
construction manifested itself mainly, as far as the agricultural co-operatives 
were concerned, in a sense that on the basis of the construction agricultural 
co-operatives were reckoned among the “primary producers”. Their legal 
capacity was therefore essentially restricted to agricultural producing activities 
in a narrower sense of the term, i. e. to a single basic activity in the process of 
economy. On the other hand, agricultural co-operatives were barred from all 
other phases of economy and were consequently deprived of the chance to 
bring about a harmony between the productive and operative risks of the agri­
cultural co-operative and its potentialities. Hence this narrower construction 
given to the legal capacity of the co-operative as a juristic person is conflicting 
with the interests of the co-operative economy and can be approved in no 
circumstances.
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On the other hand, in the period of the new system of economic manage­
ment, in both principle and practice, the extensive construction of the legal 
capacity of the co-operative as a juristic person is the characteristic feature of 
co-operatives. This extensive construction is substantiated by objective econo­
mic regularities, in particular in the case of producing co-operatives, as econo­
mic activities at own risk in all circumstances insist on the extension of the 
legal capacity of the co-operative to the whole process of economic activities 
(i. e. purchase, production, processing, sale) and also permit the achievement of 
other ends (servicing activities,sporting and cultural ends, etc.). Consequently, 
as regards the objects of co-operative ownership, the legal capacity of the co­
operative extends to all tilings, assets which are needed for the achievement of 
the economic and other ends of the operation of the co-operative.
However, for the purpose of co-operative property, the form in which a 
thing may become the object of co-operative property is by no means immate­
rial. As has already been made clear, co-operative property is direct group 
property and accordingly the objects of ownership as things are in the direct 
ownership of the co-operative, i. e. the co-operative possesses and uses the 
objects of co-operative property directly as owner.
However, co-operative economy, and at the same time the integration of 
co-operative ownership, of necessity have brought about that the co-operatives 
should be owners of the things as objects of ownership not only directly, but 
also indirectly, i. e. through another economic unit, which is also a juristic 
person. Typical forms of this indirect ownership are the various associations of 
co-operatives of which the best known is the joint enterprise or the joint co­
operative concern. As has already been made clear in this case, the legal con­
struction is that the direct owner of the thing in the physical sense is the joint 
enterprise or the joint co-operative concern, whereas the indirect owners are 
the co-operatives establishing the enterprise. Legally the indirect ownership of 
the co-operatives establishing the enterprise finds expression in the form that 
in the ownership of these co-operatives the joint enterprise or the co-operative 
enterprise, and through it its owners become owners of the assets in the joint 
enterprise or the co-operative enterprise. In other words, the object of co-opera­
tive ownership is the joint enterprise and the joint co-operative concern as 
juristic persons, at a time when the joint enterprise or the joint co-operative 
concern itself is the direct owner of the assets or things handled segregated 
by it.
On this understanding the general rule may be proposed tha t in principle 
each co-operative has a right to become owner of the joint enterprise or joint 
co-operative concern in the form of co-operative joint property. The law even 
enables the co-operatives as juristic persons to become owners in this sense.
The legal situation is by no means as clear-cut when it comes to answer the 
question whether a co-operative alone may establish an enterprise operating ¡is 
an independent juristic person. Or in other words, can an enterprise be the 
object of co-operative ownership if the enterprise has been established and is 
operated by a co-operative ?
C lause (1) Section 66 of the Civil Code answers the question by declaring 
that the federations and centres of co-operatives may establish co-operative 
enterprises in the cases and manner specified by provisions of law. This means 
that individual co-operatives, or member co-operatives belonging to federa-
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tions and centres of co-operatives cannot alone establish an enterprise or set up 
an enterprise of their own. To this we would add tha t subsequent legal regula­
tion relies on this provision of the Civil Code, so that not even Act I I I  of 1967 
on Agricultural Co-operatives authorizes solitary agricultural co-operatives to 
form and operate enterprises of their own, moreover, if the agricultural co­
operative remains sole in a joint co-operative concern or a joint co-operative 
enterprise, such concern or enterprise may henceforth operate only as a domestic 
economic unit of the co-operative, i. e. it ceases to operate as an independent 
juristic person, although it continues its activities unchanged as before.
In connexion with Clause (1) Section 66 of the Civil Code it should be 
remembered that at the time of the promulgation of the Civil Code federations of 
producing co-operatives were unknown, and other co-operative federal organi­
zations or centres operated in a manner characteristic of the period of the 
centralized economic mechanism. On the other hand, agricultural co-operatives 
now have social organizations of their own, they have a well established federal 
organization, and what is of significance, the federal organizations of the other 
co-operatives may also change over to methods of operation on principles 
similar to those embodied by the federal organizations of producing co-opera­
tives, i. e. they may democratize their federal organization and its operation.
However, among the functions of the regional federations of the producing 
co-operatives, there do not figure any economic activities through the agency 
of an enterprise of the federation’s own, although this is not expressly prohibited 
by provisions of law. On the other hand, the regional federations of other 
co-operatives may within the specified limits operate, or establish enterprises 
of their own.
The legal provisions governing the regional federations of agricultural 
co-operatives fail to answer the question whether a regional federation of agri­
cultural co-operatives may, as an autonomous juristic person take part as 
founder or associate in the establishment and operation of an independent 
joint enterprise or joint co-operative concern.
The analysis of the problem may be continued, still it will be clear even so 
that there are discrepancies between the federations and the “centres” of the 
particular co-operative branches as far as the establishment and operation of 
enterprises of their own are concerned, although the relevant provision of the 
Civil Code draws no clear-cut line between co-operative federations and centres 
in this respect. Obviously, the actually existing distinction must be considered 
transient and in a re-statement of co-operative law necessarily the inequality 
existing in the right of the co-operatives to set up enterprises of their own will 
have to be abolished. From the point of view of legislation, this would mean 
that irrespective of the co-operative branches each federation and centre of 
co-operatives will have to be authorized uniformly to take part in co-operative 
associations as founder or associate, or establish a co-operative enterprise of its 
own. In this respect, perhaps as the only permissible restriction, the law should 
decree that branch federations should be barred from establishing an enterprise 
which may become the competitor of a member co-operative included in the 
branch federation, or of the different co-operative associations created by the 
member co-operatives.
A problem much more difficult to tackle is whether or not co-operatives 
may be authorized to establish enterprises of their own. As has already been
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mentioned, in conformity with valid law, co-operatives may not set up an 
enterprise of their own. All they can do is to form co-operative associations.
However, under the circumstances of the new system of economic manage­
ment, more and more co-operatives raise the demand for the foundation and 
operation of enterprises of their own. Demands of this sort emerge in the first 
place at producing co-operatives. The economic incentive may perhaps lie in 
the fact that producing co-operatives are eager to have a share in the entire 
process of economy, but this process may be split up into parts whose’ opera­
tion in the form of independent enterprises may be more advantageous for the 
co-operative, or may influence the other sections of economic management in a 
positive manner.
As an example again the agricultural co-operatives may be quoted. Accor­
ding to Clause (1) Section 43 of Act III on Agricultural Co-operatives “Co­
operatives shall be engaged in agricultural production and processing of pro­
ducts, servicing and other supplementary activities, as well as in purchase 
and sale.” This provision clearly states that an agricultural co-operative may 
carry on activities in a particular branch of economy from the beginning to end. 
However, the phases of any branch of economy are separated from one another 
to an extent that, especially in larger agricultural co-operatives, different 
groups of the members are active in different phase, and the assets required for 
their operations are also assigned to their management. Essentially, this leads 
to the formation of independent economic units within the farm. The economic 
independence of these economic units within the farm may even satisfy the 
needs, provided that these economic units entertain no external relations and 
have not to act in external legal relations. But as soon as their activities have 
grown to dimensions which force them to take part, to a great extent or even 
wholly, in external legal relations, the demand will at once be forth coming on 
the part of these units for their greater convenience to act in these external 
legal relations directly, in their own name, this method being preferable for 
all parties concerned. This applies in particular to the servicing activities, to 
certain degree to processing, but mainly to sales, let alone that e. g. an in­
dependent processing unit (e. g. a canning plant) often engages in purchasing, 
processing and the marketing of the processed goods directly. In such and 
similar cases the desire on the part of the unit to continue its activities as an 
independent juristic person, as the enterprise of the co-operative, may be 
wholly justified. This would be convenient not only for the economic unit and 
third persons directly dealing with it, but in the majority of cases also for the 
co-operative.
This method would be more convenient for the agricultural co-operative as 
a whole, beacuse in this case the management of the co-operative would have 
no direct dealings with the independent unit, it would not have to attend to its 
problems, as all of them would now be settled by the management of the enter­
prise of the co-operative. Consequently the management of the co-operative 
could give more attention to the basic activity of the co-operative proper, viz. 
agricultural production. In dealing with the affairs of economic units, which 
might as well become independent, management will often dissipate its time 
and energy, and will have neither left to deal with the fundamental activity of 
the co-operative, i. e. agricultural production, to the desirable extent.
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Similarly it would be hard to find proper reasons why a co-operative, left 
alone in a formerly joint enterprise or a co-operative enterprise, which enterprise 
has hitherto operated as an independent juristic person, should not continue 
its activities in the earlier form, in particular when all enterprisal relations have 
been established in this form and would be preferred by both the unit and its 
business partners.
On the basis of the reasons enumerated here schematically, only the opi­
nion may be advanced that in the course of future legal regulation within 
definite limits even a single co-operative should be authorized to set up an 
enterprise of its own.
Another important facet of this problem is to decide under what rules an 
enterprise set up by a co-operative should operate, irrespective of whether 
this enterprise has been called into life by a co-operative federation, centre or 
e. g. an agricultural co-operative. According to clause (2) of Section 66 of the 
Civil Code, the provisions governing state enterprises should be applied to the 
legal capacity, organization and operation of a co-operative enterprise set up by 
a federation or centre. Still it stands to reason that under the conditions of the 
new system of economic management this provision has become obsolete, and 
consequently new provisions will have to be introduced for the legal capacity, 
organization and operation of co-operative enterprises. Since the promulgation 
of the Civil Code such provisions have on the whole come into being, but 
comprehensive legislation meeting actual demands would also be an urgent 
task of the legislator.
II.
Joint (mixed) co-operative ownership
1. The evolution of a socialist co-operative economy, the economic integra­
tion making headway there, necessarily have brought about also the integration 
of co-operative ownership, which eventually will lead to the emergence of 
joint co-operative property. It is characteristic of this process of integration 
that co-operative group property does not become joint co-operative property 
in its entirety, but only in definite parts, and even so in a form that the co­
operative does not forfeit it ownership. The quality of the co-operative as 
owner will remain even in this case, but in a changed form, because not a 
single co-operative, but several co-operatives together will appear as subjects 
of joint co-operative ownership.
Before discussing this topic, first of all some concepts will have to be defi­
ned. As a matter of fact, practice in this field is rather variegated, and far from 
being settled. Often even those may find it hard to get their bearings here, who 
for the positions they are holding ought to be familiar with this field.
a) As has been mentioned, joint co-operative property has its origins in the 
economic associations of the co-operatives. However, not all co-operative eco­
nomic associations produce joint co-operative property. A simple association 
of co-operatives for production will not created joint co-operative property, 
even if the association handles the assets for the achievement of its ends separa­
ted from other assets. The more elaborate forms of the economic associations
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of co-operatives, which operate as independent juristic persons, will in each 
ease create joint co-operative property. As a general rule it may be stated that 
as a result of the economic associations of co-operatives, joint co-operative 
property will not be produced unless the association operates as an independent 
juristic person.
So far this more developed form of the economic associations of co-operati­
ves has, apart from mixed enterprises, created two types of juristic person, 
namely, first, the joint, and, secondly, the joint co-operative enterprise. How­
ever, it would seem that these two types of juristic person do not meet all needs 
of the economic associations of co-operatives, i. e. in addition to these two 
forms, demands have been forthcoming for a t least another form of association 
as a juristic person, which would be suitable for meeting the needs for associa­
tion of co-operative (and other economic) units which insist on a method of 
operation in the form of an independent juristic person, but fail to satisfy the 
conditions of a joint concern or a joint co-operative enterprise. This third 
variant could perhaps be some sort of a “joint co-operative economic associa­
tion’’, This association should then formulate the conditions of an independent 
juristic person in a form which would satisfy any needs in the scope of co-opera­
tive economic associations, which outstrip the framework of a joint concern 
or a joint co-operative enterprise as a juristic person.
Coming back to the existing forms of co-operative associations operating 
as juristic persons, where joint co-operative property may come into being, we 
have to advance the statement that joint co-operative property created in 
this way is not uniform. Practical experience tends to show that, to a certain 
degree, joint co-operative property may differ depending on the agencies which 
have brought about the co-operative economic association in the form of a con­
cern or enterprise. For practical purposes the following cases may occur:
1. When two or more co-operatives belonging to a definite co-operative 
branch bring about an economic association, this will be a “co-operative branch 
association”, and the property so accumulated will be the typical form of 
manifestation of joint co-operative property.
2. When two or more co-operatives belonging to several co-operative 
branches bring about an economic association, this will be a “mixed co-operative 
association”, and the property so accumulated will be a “mixed joint co-opera­
tive property.”
3. When two or more co-operatives belonging to one or more co-operative 
branches and one or more state enterprises bring about and operate an economic 
association, this will be a “mixed economic association”, and the property so 
accumulated will be “mixed joint social property”. According to valid Hunga­
rian law, the co-operative or non-co-operative character of mixed joint social 
property is determined by the agencies which have formed the enterprise. As a 
matter of fact when the joint enterprise or concern has been formed by co­
operatives. and the state or any other economic units take part in the associa­
tion in a subsidiary character, then the mixed joint social property will be of 
the co-operative type. On the other hand, when the economic association has 
been launched by state enterprises, and the co-operatives take part in it in a 
subsidiary role and not as founders, then, in principle, the mixed joint social 
property will be of a non-co-operative character, and even if it will not have the 
nature ol state property, it will in general be closer to the mixed joint social
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property of the state. Mixed joint social property has two types: first, mixed 
social property of the co-operative type, and, secondly, for want of a better 
name, mixed social property of the non-co-operative type.
b) i t  would seem that there is no essential difference between joint co­
operative property and mixed joint co-operative property. The two differ from 
each other only in so far as in the one co-operatives belonging to a particular co­
operative branch take part as co-owners, whereas co-operatives belonging to 
several co-operative branches are the co-owners in the other.
However, this apparently formal difference actually cloaks discrepancies 
whose elimination and uniform legal regulation is the task of the near future. 
This applies in particular to the preconditions of a participation in the founda­
tion of a joint concern or a joint co-operative enterprise. As regards agricultural 
co-operatives the resolution of the general assembly is sufficient for the founda­
tion of a joint enterprise. On the other hand, in the other co-operative branches 
there is an uncertainty among the co-operatives whether or not the resolution 
of the general assembly, or the management (board) is sufficient, or the consent 
or licence of an external agency (federation of co-operatives, or a state adminis­
trative organ) is needed. Similarly, there is uncertainty in the associations of co­
operatives, partly also in the agricultural co-operatives, and in particular in the 
other co-operatives, as to whether the subscription to a definite part of the 
capital stock may be deemed to be equal to a participation in the association, or 
beyond this the direct personal co-operation of the co-owners is indispensable. 
Personal co-operation constitutes a problem in the everyday activities of the 
association through the agency of the workers and employees rather than in the 
management, where the problem can be solved in each particular case. The 
problem may become particularly serious in associations of non-producing co­
operatives where the members are under no obligation whatever to take part 
in common work, and consequently the co-operative cannot rely on the working 
capacity of its members.
The two question which have been raised indicate that the existing uncer­
tainty has to be removed by some sort of a uniform legal regulation, taking as 
the basis the final settlement of the problem by the Agricultural Co-operatives 
Act. Accordingly, for a participation in an association of co-operatives, both for 
foundation and subsequent accession, the resolution of the general assembly, 
or of the management, or board, should suffice in any type of co-operative. 
For a direct co-operation in the association, in addition to the financial contri­
bution, as a general obligation the “personal” co-operation in the management 
of the association (on the board, or in the management and the control commit­
tee) should be satisfactory in both agricultural and other co-operatives.
c) As compared to joint co-operative property, or mixed joint co-operative 
property, a considerably larger number of problems crop up in the case of 
mixed joint social property.
First of all, we propose to deal with the problem of the foundation of a 
mixed economic association. In conformity with valid law, it is decided already 
at the foundation whether or not the mixed social property will be of a co­
operative character. Under valid law, when a mixed association is brought 
about by co-operatives, the mixed joint social property will be of a co-operative 
type. On the other hand, when the association is formed by state enterprises 
with the subsequent accession of co-operatives, the mixed joint social property
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will be of the non-co-operative type, and will be closer to state social property. 
In point of fact, co-operatives cannot found a non-co-operative mixed associa­
tion, nor can state enterprises forma co-operative-type mixed association. Also 
when co-operatives and state enterprises in conjunction form a mixed associa­
tion, this will be of a non-co-operative character.
What is logically clear is that when exclusively co-operatives form the 
association, and this will take on a mixed character only by the accession of a 
state enterpi'ise, the association can be only of the co-operative type. This is 
the proper attitude simply because the co-operative type is more convenient 
for the co-operatives, and also the association may operate in harmony with the 
principles of co-operative economy.
On the other hand, logic seems to have been ignored in the case when only 
state enterprises bring about the association, with the subsequent accession of 
co-operatives. I t may be questioned why in this case the state enterprises 
should not be allowed themselves to decide the character of the association,
i. e. why it should not be left to the state enterprises to decide whether the 
association should be one of a co-operative character, or not. Similarly it is 
somewhat illogical that when state enterprises and co-operatives in conjunction 
establish an association, why should it not be the parties themselves that decide 
the character of their association.
I t does not sound very convincing that the granting of a choice would in any 
way become prejudicial to state social property. In fact here is a case of divisible 
joint property, where the participation in the profits is defined by the ratio of 
the financial contribution to the venture, so that in the last resort the share 
due to the state will anyhow find its way to the state treasury, even if not di­
rectly and to its full extent from the association, still, in all events through 
the channel of the state enterprise taking part in the association as co-owner. 
On the other hand, the co-operative character will instill a spirit of democracy, 
freedom and elasticity into the operations of the association, not to speak of 
the circumstance that in an association a state enterprise will find it more con­
venient to adapt itself to co-operative economy than vice versa, i. e. a co-opera­
tive to state enterprise economy in the same association.
As regards the formation of mixed economic associations, a regulation 
may therefore in practice promote the operations of the association by which 
co-operatives should form economic associations of a pure co-operative cha­
racter only, whereas state enterprises, or state enterprises and co-operatives in 
conjunction may bring about economic associations whose co-operative or 
non-co-operative character should be decided by the founders.
For mixed economic associations, the problem of direct co-operation on 
the part of the co-owner economic units taking part in the association still 
remains to be settled. As regards direct co-operation in principle, two paths are 
open, the choice of either being dependent on the character of the mixed associa­
tion. As a matter of fact, when the mixed economic association is of the co­
operative type, then the direct co-operation of the economic units participating 
in the association is on the whole of the same nature as in the event of an 
association of co-operatives. For practical p u r p o s e s  this means that the direct 
co-operation of the participants in the mixed economic association manifests it­
self partly in the form of financial contribution, partly in the form of so-called 
personal co-operation. In this case, too, this personal co-operation cannot
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oblige to more than to a personal co-operation in the management of the 
association (board of executives, management and control committee).
On the other hand, in a non-co-operative mixed economic association, 
direct co-operation of the economic units constituting the association will be 
fundamentally of a financial character. But owing to the non-co-operative cha­
racter of the association, the participants cannot be obliged to personal co­
operation. Consequently a mixed economic association of this type will essen­
tially become a “limited partnership” company, where the primary end is the 
profitable investment of capitals, whereas participation of the associating 
economic units in the operations of the mixed economic association is thrust 
back to a secondary position. In a mixed economic association of this type, so- 
called personal co-operation cannot be expected from the economic units 
participating in the association, because such a co-operation is not implied in 
the structure of the association. For a vigorous development of the national 
economy it would be better if the economic units did not invest capital super­
fluous in their own business through the intervention of banks, but made use of 
it in production, in the specified phase of operations, where with the aid of 
such capital production values could be produced or augmented, as the case may 
be, and, by this, earned greater profits for both themselves and the national 
economy.
For that matter, why should the “limited ownership” form of an economic 
association be alien to the socialist economic and social system, when as a result 
of the existence of this type, it is the given form of socialist social property and 
the socialist economy which will benefit from this, and not private property 
and private economy? The form of limited ownership can be beneficial not 
only to private proprietors in a capitalist society, but also to socialist economic 
units in a socialist society.
If this is true, then in point of principle hardly any objections could be 
raised to such economic associations being formed without putting any artificial 
obstacles in their way. Nor can the participation of a socialist economic unit be 
contested in an economic association, when this unit can contribute money only 
to the association, whereas it lays no claim to a personal co-operation, nor can 
it do so even when the other partners take part in the economic association 
financially as well as personally.
These possible variants will by no means affect the joint ownership charac­
ter of co-operative and non-co-operative mixed joint socialist property, or 
bring about changes in it. Still they might provide facilities for a reinforce­
ment of the socialist economy and through it of the socialist system of owner­
ship.
On the basis of what has been set forth above, the direct co-operation of 
the socialist economic units participating in mixed economic associations 
should be brought under regulation uniformly, i. e. irrespective of the co­
operative or non-co-operative character of the mixed economic association, in a 
way that financial participation of the co-owners should be made obligatory by 
shares as agreed upon, yet direct personal co-operation should not be made 
compulsory. However, in the event of a mixed economic association of the 
co-operative type also direct personal co-operation would be desirable in addition 
to financial contribution. Here an exemption should be granted only to the
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oo-owncis who are relieved oi the obligation of a direct personal co-operation 
by unanimous vote of the other co-owners.
Finally, in connexion with this problem, mention should be made of the 
demand forthcoming from the field, on grounds of principle not to be disappro­
ved, that facilities should be provided for the constitution of mixed economic 
associations as juristic persons which do not create mixed joint social property, 
there being no need for it in their operations.
d) On the understanding of what has been made clear so far of joint 
(mixed) co-operative property, a few generalizing conclusions may be drawn.
First, since there is no essential difference between joint co-operative 
property and mixed joint co-operative property, the still existing slight diffe­
rences should be evened out, and the two types of property then subjected to 
uniform regulation. In fact a continued differentiation between these two types 
of joint co-operative property appears to be wholly unjustified. Consequently, 
irrespective of whether two or more co-operatives belonging to one or more co­
operative branches, bring about an economic association, this association 
should be considered being of the co-operative type and the property so created 
should be deemed to be joint co-operative property. For a participation in a co­
operative association of this type, either in the capacity of a founder, or by 
subsequent accession to it, the resolution of the general assembly or of the 
management (board) of the participating co-operatives should suffice. Direct 
co-operation in the co-operative association should be realized in the form of 
financial contribution, or in a personal co-operation in the management (board 
or managing council, or control committee) of the association. To certain parti­
cipants an exemption may be granted from the obligation of personal co-opera­
tion by a unanimous resolution of the other members of the association. By 
agreement of the associates, the obligation of personal co-operation may be 
extended to the provision of the labour force required for the operation of the 
association.
Secondly, when a state enterprise joins an association of co-operatives, the 
co-operative association will change into a mixed economic association of co­
operative type. As regards the mixed economic associations, a regulation is 
desirable according to which if state enterprises, or state enterprises in con­
junction with co-operatives, form an economic association, the co-operative or 
non-co-operative type of this association should be decided by the founders 
themselves. Mixed joint social property so created is either mixed joint social 
property of a co-operative, or of a non-co-operative type. For a participation in 
such mixed economic associations, as far as the co-operatives are concerned, 
the resolution of the general assembly or the management (board) should 
suffice. Direct co-operation in the mixed economic association in the form of 
financial contribution should be made obligatory; but for mixed economic 
associations of a co-operative type, personal co-operation should also be com­
pulsory, however, in the same form as for co-operative economic associations. 
It should be noted that in the course of future legislation the rules of operation 
of non-co-operative mixed economic associations should be approximated to 
the rules governing the mixed economic associations of the co-operative type.
On the other hand, this trend of thought will lead us to the recognition of 
the need for a uniform codification of the law of associations. Furthermore if 
the unified law of associations is construed so as to mean the uniform regulation
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of any economic; association irrespective of whether an economic association 
has been formed and is operated by co-operatives or state enterprises, or by 
the two in conjunction, then in our opinion the unified law of associations 
should be converted into a law of associations of a “co-operative character” for 
both co-operative and state enterprise associations, or for the mixed associa­
tions of the two. The law should have a co-operative character for the very 
reason that the otherwise desirable development in this field can be achieved 
only in this way in all fields of the national economy, let alone the fact that 
when this is not done not only the economic associations of state enterprises 
would fail to grow in the desired way, but also the development of the existing 
economic associations of the co-operatives would suffer a setback which would 
be a harmful and undesired economic phenomenon for the co-operative move­
ment and the national economy alike.
Thirdly, both the co-operative and the mixed economic associations should 
be allowed to operate as independent juristic persons in a sense that the legal 
entity status of the association should not extend to joint social property. 
This is essential in particular as far as purchases and sales are concerned, i. e. in 
the commercial sphere where the costs of the association would have to be 
borne by ratios as agreed upon by the associates, whereas the profits of the 
operation of the association would appear directly at the associates, and not at 
the association, yet through its agency. Here considerations of operation do not 
insist upon a lasting separation of joint social property in respect to ownership 
within the association, i. e. the right of the association to the management of 
property in its capacity of a juristic person satisfies the needs of operation, so 
that the institutionalization of joint social property may be dispensed with 
here.
2. All that has been said of joint (mixed) co-operative property applies 
to joint social property winch comes into being as the result of the economic 
associations of the co-operatives, or as that of the economic associations of co- 
peratives and other economic units. This group of the joint (mixed) co-opera­
tive property is essentially “joint inter-co-operative (inter-enterprisal) social 
property”, as one of the form of manifestation of social group property.
However, as has already been made clear, from this type of property the 
type of joint co-operative property has to be distinguished, which comes into 
being independently of the result of the economic associations of co-operatives, 
i. e. whose origin and function is expressly attached to the social collaboration 
of co-operatives, to the creation and operation of the federal agencies of the 
co-operatives.
As is known, in a number of branch co-operatives, at the various federal 
organizational units, the member co-operatives accumulate a so-called “Mutual 
Assistance Fund” from the payments of the co-operatives and other sources. 
I t admits of no doubt that the owners of the assets of this Fund are the member 
co-operatives of the co-operative federation, i. e. the owner is not the co-opera­
tive federal organization managing the fund. Apart from the purposes for 
which the agency managing this fund is free and even bound to appropriate it, 
the fact of the indivisible joint ownership of the fund remains, i. e. it is com­
munity property rather than joint property. This epithet at the same time gives 
expression to the branch-co-operative character and to the indivisibility of this
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property. Hence this category of joint co-operative property is “co-operative 
community property”.
The Mutual Assistance Fund as the primary form of manifestation of 
co-operative community property, is not yet general in all co-operative bran­
ches. Valid statutory regulations contain no provisions for a mutual assistance 
fund in the federal system of agricultural co-operatives; on the other hand, the 
federal system of general purchasing and marketing co-operatives (SZÔVOSZ) 
includes the possibility of, and regulations for, such a fund.
The Fund itself is a phenomenon of the co-operative movement which can, 
and should be made general in each co-operative bi'ancli, hence also in the 
agricultural co-operatives. Consequently in re-statement of the law of co-opera­
tives the creation, management and appropriation of the Mutual Assistance 
Fund should be brought under uniform regulation with validity for each co­
operative branch, as one of the forms of co-operative community property.
To this we have to add tha t co-operative community property deserves by 
far more attention in both co-operative economic policy and co-operative 
legislation than was given to it earlier, and more conscious efforts should be 
made towards the establishment of this institution and towards its statutory 
and economic consolidation.
So, e. g., in the agricultural co-operative movement, the so-called Funds 
for the Management of Co-operative Assets have been known for some time. 
Under present Hungarian law the management of this Fund is the responsibility 
of the regional federations of the co-operatives. Essentially, the assets pooled in 
the Fund for the Management of Co-operative Assets represent one of the 
concrete manifestations forms of co-operative community property. Accumula­
tion and growth of the fund are wholly dependent on contingency, as, so to 
say, its exclusive source is the net capital remaining after the termination of 
co-operatives by way of winding up or dissolution. This residual capital has to be 
remitted to the Fund for the Management of Co-operative Assets, and appro­
priated for the purposes of agricultural co-operatives.
Since, actually, also in the other co-operative branches co-operative mana­
gement and the position of co-operative group property develop in very much 
the same way as in the agricultural co-operative branch, the conclusion to 
bring under uniform regulation the Fund for the Management of Co-operative 
Assets, and all problems of management and appropriation of assets forming 
co-operative community property, appears to be wholly logical.
Also a uniform statutory regulation having the merger of the Fund for the 
Management of Co-operative Assets with the Mutual Assistance Fund as its 
target should be considered. In this way the principal form of manifestation of 
co-operative community property would in each co-operative branch be the 
Mutual Assistance Fund.
3. In the economic associations of co-operatives, and in t he mixed economic 
associations, the harmony of operation and ownership should be enforced in the 
same way as in any other branch form of co-operatives. Here, too, the enforce­
ment of this harmony necessarily urges an adaptation of ownership to operations. 
On the other hand, operation takes place in any economy association on an 
associative level i. e. it is not directly the co-operatives (and the state enter­
prises) bringing about the association that take care of the operation of the
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association, but it is directly the economic association as juristic person created 
by them.
A logical consequence is that if the association actually in charge of opera­
tion is not the owner, but the owners are only the co-operatives (state enterpri­
ses) creating the association, then in tliis case there is no direct unity and har­
mony between operation and ownership in the association, i. e. one of the funda­
mental characteristics of co-operative (enterprisal) group property, i. e. the 
direct unity and harmony of operation and ownership will be wanting.
On the other hand if only the economic association is the owner, then 
although there will be direct harmony between operation and ownership in the 
association, yet on the whole the association will not only be estranged from the 
creating co-operatives (state enterprises), but even become detached from 
them, i. e. the association will become independent in a way running counter to 
the interests of the economic units which have created it. In other words this 
would mean that under such a legal construction the co-operatives (state 
enterprises) would refrain from bringing about economic associations merely for 
want of a direct interest attaching them to such an association.
For co-operative economic associations a statutory expedient had to be 
found for bringing about a harmony between operation and ownership, which 
expresses and satisfies the needs of tliis harmony and the interests of the co­
operatives constituting the economic association as owners. The statutory 
expedient would in this case satisfy the basic needs and interests by an appro­
priate coupling of the categories of the direct and indirect owners. The essence 
of this statutory expedient is that for joint co-operative property the direct 
owner is the economic association itself, and the indirect owners are the co­
operatives creating the association. Law would then couple these two categories 
of owners in a way that to the external world the association would appear as 
owner of the assets of the association, still the association would pass into the 
ownership of the co-operatives creating it. I. e. the co-operative economic 
association would at the same time appear as subject and object of ownership.
This expedient has received statutory regulation in Act II I  of 1967 on 
Agricultural Co-operatives, dealing with joint enterprises and joint co-operative 
concerns. Accordingly, in case of a joint co-operative enterprise the fixed and 
current assets which the founders, and those joining the joint enterprise subse­
quently have surrendered, further the assets produced by the activities of the 
enterprise, the proceeds from their sales and from services rendered, further 
assets purchased by the enterprise or acquired by it by any other title, are in the 
ownership of the enterprise. The enterprise is the joint property of the founders 
and those joining it at a later time. The share in the property is defined by the 
respective financial contributions of the members.
This legal adaptation of the joint co-operative property to the exigencies 
of actual operations does in every respect meet the condition of a direct har­
mony between operations and ownership, and at the same time respects the in­
terests of the maintaining co-operatives as owners.
Obviously in a re-statement of co-operative law for both co-operative 
economic associations and mixed economic associations, i. e. for both the joint 
co-operative property and the mixed joint social property, this statutory struc­
ture should be made general and uniform. As regards joint co-operative property, 
irrespective of whether the economic association has been formed by co-operati-
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ves belonging to one or more co-operative branches, practice already relies on 
this legal structure. But this should be made also the rule for mixed economic 
associations, not only when the mixed economic association is of a co-operative 
type, but also when it has been created as a non-co-operative economic associa­
tion.
In a certain sense the problem may assume a different form in the event of 
co-operativecommunityproperty. In general, operations with assets in co-opera­
tive community ownership are usually operations of a non-enterprisal type 
(although this is not precluded); in a certain sense they remind of budgetary 
or financial (banking) operations, where the needs of management are fully 
satisfied by the right to management. In the last analysis, this right to the 
management of property, and also the direct management of property, is 
exercised by the organs appointed by the owners for ends defined by the owners, 
and constituted as regional or national agencies of the co-operatives. Although 
these managing organs are juristic persons, they belong to a category where the 
executive body is re-elected by the owners from among their own ranks at 
definite intervals, i. e. in this respect these organs act as separate agencies, so to 
say as the trustees of the owners. In other words this means that, although not 
on the principle of direct, but on that of representative democracy, yet on a 
democratic basis, there is a harmony between co-operative community owners­
hip and operations on the basis of this ownership.
4. In conjunction with co-operative community property the prolems of 
the ownership of the co-operative federations, the enterprises of the regional 
and national federations of the co-operatives, and assets deposited at these 
enterprises have to be discussed.
Legally the direct harmony between operations and ownership should be 
enforced as a principal rule even in these enterprises. Here the statutory struc­
ture may be regarded as given. Even in this case, since it is one of economic 
units taking part in enterprisal operations, the direct owner of the enterprisal 
assets is the enterprise itself, in about the same way as e. g. the joint co-opera­
tive enterprise is owner.
On the other hand, the ownership of the enterprise of a regional or national 
federation of co-operatives is a much debated, yet for practical purposes vital 
problem. Is such a co-operative enterprise in the ownership of the regional or 
national federation of co-operatives as a legal entity, or in that of the member 
co-operatives belonging to the co-operative branch in question ? The problem 
is crucial also on considerations of the theory of ownership. Namely in the first 
instance the federal enterprise is simply co-operative group property, whose 
owner is, independent of the member co-operatives, the regional or national co­
operative federation as a juristic person. In the second instance, the federal 
enterprise is not co-operative group property, or joint co-operative property, 
but co-operative community property, whose owners are the member co-opera­
tives belonging to the given co-operative branch in about the same way as the 
member co-operatives are owners also of the assets in the Mutual Assistance 
Fund.
The problem is not a serious one as far as the agricultural co-operatives are 
concerned, since here neither the regional federations of co-operatives, nor the 
National Council of Co-operatives have enterprises of their own. On the other 
hand, a solution of the problem is urged in the case of the General Federation of
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Consumers’ Co-operatives (SZÜVOSZ), or the County Federation of the General 
Consumers’ Co-operatives, where such enterprises exist, or continue to operate. 
Section IV/3 of the provisional statutes of the National Federation of General 
Consumers’ Co-operatives decrees among others that its non-servicing enter­
prises of earlier date have to be converted into joint enterprises of the co-opera­
tives concerned, or of other agencies. However, those of the actually operating 
non-servicing enterprises, which for some reason cannot be converted into joint 
enterprises of the co-operatives, will continue to be operated by the National 
Federation as provided by law. According to the Statutes of the Federation, 
proper expression must be given to the interests and the services of the co­
operativas in the operations of these enterprises.
This provision of the Statutes of the Federation introduces further com­
plexities into the problem, by turning certain federal enterprises into joint co­
operative enterprises, namely the joint enterprises of the co-operatives con­
cerned and of other agencies. But which are these co-operatives or other agen­
cies, to what sphere does their interest extend, to the particular member co­
operatives, or to all co-operatives belonging to the particular co-operative 
branch? Can this co-operative enterprisal property be turned into joint co-opera­
tive property divisible by its nature, and, if so, on what basic principle ? There 
is no reply in the Statutes of the Federation to such and similar questions. 
Nor do the Statutes settle the question of ownership of co-operative enterprises 
that remained within the National Federation (SZÓVOSZ).
Let us first revert to the problem of ownership of the federal co-operative 
enterprises. In this connection it should be understood that it is not the function 
of the federal organizations to continue activities through the agency of their en­
terprises, nor is it their function to invest their assets in a profitable way in an 
enterprise of their own. Their true function is in every respect, also in the sphere 
of economic activities, to promote the operations of the member co-operatives 
belonging to the given co-operative branch. For this purpose, the contributions 
of the members provide the necessary financial basis, and it would not be the 
proper course if the federal organs substituted their own activities for these 
financial contributions, rendering them superfluous in this way. All tha t can be 
approved is that they supplement this financial basis to a certain extent by 
activities of their own, preferably by activities performed by the federation in 
conjunction with a few, or all, member co-operatives, by assisting joint opera­
tions or economic association of the member co-operatives in this form. Howe­
ver, by virtue of Clause (1) of Section 66 of the Civil Code, the law does not 
preclude the operation of enterprises constituting the property of the co-opera­
tive federation, as lias been mentioned above.
However, for practical purposes, such co-operative federal enterprises 
belong to two categories; namely, these enterjirises may be such as the federa­
tion as a juristic person has founded and operates with proceeds from assets 
of its own; and, secondly, such as the federation has formed and operates with 
proceeds from assets owned by the member co-operatives, and not of its own, 
irrespective of whether or not the co-operative federation figures formally as 
founder and owner of the enterprise.
Obviously, a co-operative federal enterprise winch the federation has estab­
lished and operates with assets owned by the member co-operatives, will in the 
last analysis constitute the property of the member co-operatives, i. e. it will
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be in co-operative community ownership. In this case the co-operative federa­
tion, as an independent juristic person, will act for, and on behalf of, the mem­
ber co-operatives as the trustee of the co-operative community property, 
and will not establish the enterprise on the basis of its own separate assets, in 
its own name, i. e. the federation will act as an agency entrusted with manage­
ment and representation, in which case it will represent the interests of the 
totality of the member co-operatives belonging to it.
Consequently, the net incomes, actual profits of an enterprise of this 
category will have to be distributed among the member eo-operatives as ow­
ners. However, since this is a case of indivisible co-operative property, the 
profits cannot be distributed among the member co-operatives by any specific 
ratio, and, in our opinion, any profits will have to be placed in the Mutual 
Assistance Fund, and invested or used in conformity with the relevant rules.
In the opinion of this author, any existing co-operative enterprise which in 
conformity with the provisional statutes of the National Federation (SZÓVOSZ) 
cannot be converted into a joint co-operative enterprise, should be considered 
an enterprise in co-operative community ownership, and should be operated by 
the National Federation also in the future. This would at the same time mean 
that any profits derived from the enterprise should be paid to the Mutual As­
sistance Fund, and not to the National Federation, and should be appropriated 
as specified for this fund.
On the other hand, if this is the proper course, then it will have to be deci­
ded which of the non-servicing enterprises of the National Federation (SZÓ­
VOSZ) should be converted into joint co-operative enterprises. The principal 
consideration of any decision should be co-operative interests, i. e. the form 
should be chosen which in the given instance serves co-operative community 
interests best, and then the structure of co-operative community ownership 
should be applied as suggested by the chosen form.
5. A common trait of joint co-operative property, mixed joint social pro- 
perty, as well as of co-operative community property, is that, fundamentally, 
all these forms have an underlying financial basis. The primary character of 
the financial participation of the co-owners is confirmed by the fact that in the 
case of both joint co-operative property and mixed joint social property, the 
co-owners participate in the profits by the ratio of their financial contributions. 
This method of sharing the profits at the same time indicates that in the event 
of joint enterprises the direct personal co-operation of the co-owners is of 
secondary significance, i. e. personal co-operation has no direct influence on the 
participation in the assets. So it seems that with the given structure of joint 
enterprises, the financial participation of the co-owners and their direct perso­
nal co-operation are independent of each other. This is also confirmed by the 
fact that the participants in the joint venture reach separate agreements on 
financial participation and on personal co-operation. Consequently, for practi­
cal purposes, it is possible that one of the co-owners participates in the joint 
enterprise with a large contribution, but, as compared with his share, he delega­
tes only few of the members or employees to the board; and vice versa. In 
principle, in case of this method, it is by no means impossible that one of the 
co-owners takes part in the joint enterprise with a definite contribution in 
terms of money, whereas by common agreement he “does not insist” on a direct 
personal participation. On the other hand, this cannot be done the other way
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round, as no partner co-operative can be admitted to the joint enterprise to take 
part by way of personal co-operation only, yet without a financial contribution. 
It should also be noted that in the case of co-operative community property 
the question of a direct personal co-operation of the co-owners cannot be raised 
at all, as here the structure of ownership is from the outset based on financial 
participation, whereas the competent federal organization will take care of the 
management and exploitation of the assets.
Obviously, in cases of joint co-operative economic associations, the present 
method is not in every respect satisfactory as far as direct personal co-operation 
is concerned. The method is a democratic one, as the solution of the problems 
has in its entirety been entrusted to the associating parties. Yet since the 
statutory provisions fail to draw the limits of the solutions, practically unde­
sirable solutions may emerge without being formally in conflict with the law. 
Hence a democratic conception of the solution of this type will carry with it the 
risk of distrortions. The solution may become the source of errors, which in 
some way has to be eliminated in future regulation of co-operative economic
associations. .
However, the question may be asked, how this can be done. An obvious 
solution of the problem would lie the one where the personal co-operation of the 
participants in the economic association would be tied to their financial contri­
butions, i. e. they would be qualified for, or even bound to, a personal co-opera­
tion bv 'the proportion of their financial contributions. Undoubtedly, in this 
form of solution the word of that co-owner will carry greater weight whose 
share is the largest in the economic association, whereas the word of those 
participating with a minimum only will weight least. However, this is wholly 
understandable, and as known form it is accepted by the associating enter­
prises as just. Actually even today the situation is something like this: although 
under present law the personal co-operation of the parties to the association is 
not tied to the ratio of their financial participation, and the extent of co-opera­
tion is in its entirety defined by the agreement of the parties, still for practical 
purposes this agreement often takes into consideration the financial interest of 
the parties and adjusts the extent of the personal co-operation to this share. 
If this is the case, obviously the established practice should be recognized also 
by legislation, and at least the skeleton of this participation should be defined.
In the opinion of this author in a re-statement of the law of co-operatives 
it would not suffice to tie the personal co-operation of the associates in the 
management of the association exclusively to their financial share. In addition 
to financial interest the extent to which the associates take part in the opera­
tions of the association through their members and employees will have also to 
be considered. Hence the extent of participation in the management (board, 
management, control committee) of the economic association would be defined 
by two factors, namely the financial interest, and the number of co-operative 
members and employees transferred to the association.
This method of regulation of the personal participation in the management 
of the economic association would in all certainty meet with the agreement of 
the co-operatives, and would not be conflicting with the co-operative character 
of the association nor joint co-operative ownership.
In connexion with this problem it should be remembered that in Hungary 
only juristic persons of a socilalist character may take part in economic associa-
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tions, i. e. the participation of non-socialist juristic persons or of private persons 
in economic associations is precluded from the very outset. This is entirelv 
understandable, and requires no particular reasoning. However, in the opinion 
of this author, in practice this by itself proper rule should be enforced with 
greater elasticity than before, and facilities should be provided for the profi­
table investment of certain assets in economic associations by trustees who, 
owing to their office, could otherwise hardly take part in an economic associa­
tion (e. g. the profitable investment of trust estates, etc.).
6. Since in the course of this discussion, though in a scattered form, we 
have spoken of the divisibility or indivisibility of the forms of joint ownership, 
here by way of a summary the following statement may be advanced on this 
problem:
a) The joint co-operative property is to its full extent divisible by the 
ratio of the financial participation of the co-owners. In principle, the divisibility 
of this form of joint ownership will exist even if it is a case of an economic 
association where all co-operatives belonging to the given co-operative branch 
are co-owners, i. e. it is an economic association on a national level. However, 
for practical purposes, in co-operative economic associations on a national 
(county) level, the joint co-operative property functions as indivisible property, 
at least as long the association is economically justified. Naturally, the actual 
indivisibility of this ownership does not preclude the participation of the co- 
ow ners in a manner defined by their financial shares in the association, but a 
personal co-operation in the management of the association will of necessity 
become indirect. It will be indirect because in a branch-co-operative economic 
association operating on an all-national level, the delegation of a representative 
by each co-owner co-operative to the board would hardly be feasible. But it 
would be obvious to use the National Federation of the branch as a substitute 
for direct delegation, which in fact is the elected representative organ of the 
co-owner co-operatives.
b) Similarly, mixed joint social property is divisible in its entirety by the 
latios of the financial participation of the co-owners. In the present develop­
mental phase of the economic associations, this form of joint ownership does not 
show trends towards becoming indivisible for practical purposes in the present 
case, similarly to the joint co-operative property of branch-co-operative econo­
mic associations on a national level.
c) Co-operative community property is indivisible in its entirety, however, 
this indivisibility is ol a nature w'hich not only does not preclude, but even 
presupposes, an utilization of the property in a way serving the interests of the 
community of the owner co-operatives. From this the conclusion can be drawn 
that co-operative community property is a higher, more developed form of 
manifestation of co-operative group property, i. e. a phase, and at the same time 
a step, towai’ds the transformation of co-operative group property into all­
national property.
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Some problems oi diverse traits in co-operative property
1. In  addition to the general, i. e. common traits of co-operative property, 
peculiar traits, or characteristic features departing from the general, appear in 
certain concrete forms of co-operative property as a matter of course. In this 
case the question is not one of how co-operative property in general differs 
from other forms of property, e. g. state or personal property, but to what 
extent and how certain concrete manifestation forms of co-operative property 
differ within this system from others while these differences do not extinguish 
the co-operative nature of property, nor do they render it questionable in any 
respect. Or in simpler terms, the question here is merely by what essential pe­
culiarities the various forms of property belonging to the family of co-operative 
property differ from one another.
A study of the problem is justified by two fundamental factors. First, in 
the course of socialist economic and social development several still living 
forms of co-operative property have come into being, although the Constitution, 
and in particular the Civil Code, have tried to bring under regulation co-opera­
tive property integrated rather than differentiated, by approaching it from the 
side of the general, common peculiarities of co-operatives. Closely associated 
with this factor is the second, i. e. a tendency towards a comprehensive and 
uniform regulation of co-operative legal relations which have come into promi­
nence in these days, towards a generalization of the common traits of co-operati­
ves, while the special, differing peculiarities would be considered and brought 
under regulation only in so far as their preservation and statutory re-statement 
are justified, both economically and socially, i. e. the peculiarities are facts 
which cannot be ignored, or omitted in a statutory regulation which has uni­
formity as its objective.
Within the system of co-operative property, two large groups of traits 
departing from the general may be distinguished. One group includes the 
characteristics of traits which apply to two or more forms of co-operative 
ownership, and which, although diverse in a certain sense, at the same time 
manifest themselves as common traits of a narrower group. The second group 
includes traits which are characteristic of single forms of ownership, and there­
fore only appear as diverse traits.
a) The present analysis will be based on the forms of co-operative owners­
hip which have developed in the actually operating forms of co-operatives in 
Hungary, namely in forms which have come into being in the course of building 
socialism and are therefore lasting, developing forms of ownership.
Actually the following branch forms of co-operatives are in operation:
1. Agricultural co-operatives
2. Artisans’ co-operatives (artisans’ and domestic industrial producing 
co-operatives)
3. Consumers’ co-operatives (general consumers’ and marketing co-operati­
ves)
4. Housing co-operatives
5. Savings co-operatives.
I t  should be noted that at present the following federations of co-operatives 
exist: the National Council of Production Co-operatives of the agricultural co­
operatives; the National Federation of the Artisans’ Co-operatives, the National
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Federation of the General Consumers’ Co-operatives (SZOVOSZ) representing 
the interests of consumers’ co-operatives, including the savings and housing 
co-operatives.
In the following the analysis will be confined to the ownership of the funda­
mental co-operative units (member co-operatives) of these co-operative branch­
es. In point of fact the peculiar traits of co-operative ownership departing 
from the general and characteristic of a particular branch of co-operatives, 
present themselves mainly in these fundamental units or forms of co-operative 
group ownership.
Accordingly, Hungarian law recognizes the following as independent forms 
of co-operative ownership:
1. the ownership of agricultural co-operatives
2. the ownership of artisans’ co-operatives
3. the ownership of consumers’ co-operatives
4. the ownership of housing co-operatives
5. the ownership of savings co-operatives.
Even when it is remembered that in the terminology of co-operative owner­
ship the term “savings-co-operative property” is a rare occurrence, and, if 
occurring at all, it is mostly implied in the notion of consumers’-co-operative 
ownership, there are five current forms of co-operative ownership even today, 
which by itself is the indication of a developed system of co-operative ownership. 
And for that matter this system of co-operative ownership owes its existence 
precisely to the traits of the particular forms of co-operative ownership by 
which these depart from the general.
2. For each form of co-operative ownership, the subject of co-operative 
ownership is the co-operative as a juristic person. However, beyond this legal 
form there is as actual owner in each case the given co-operative collective. 
But if this collective is made subject to a scrutiny, differences will come into 
view between the forms of ownership according to the basis on which a given 
collective co-operates.
The collectives of producing co-operatives, i. e. of agricultural, artisans’ 
co-operatives and of domestic industries, congregate on a personal and financial 
basis. But in the present developmental phase of the co-operative movement, 
these co-operative collectives may in their entirety, or at least as a general rule, 
be considered as producing co-operative collectives existing on a personal 
basis.
Here the character of a personal co-operative association indicates that the 
members tie up their working capacity with the assets of the co-operative, i. e. 
the owners of the co-operative are at the same time its workers. This owner- 
worker status finds an expression in the membership relations of the co-opera­
tive, and, accordingly, the member have a direct share in the results of opera­
tions, and also take part in the administration of co-operative property.
Here the owner-worker status is coalesced so intensely that the one cannot 
exist without the other; and if they do, this will have repercussions on the status 
as owner. This means that if in the producing co-operative a person is active 
only under a labour contract, and not in a status of owner, then he is not a 
member of the co-operative owners’ collective. On the other hand, if somebody 
has contributed his property for the use by the co-operative, without becoming 
member of it, he will not be member of the co-operative owners’ collective,
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even if he works for the co-operative as an employee. (E. g. an extraneous 
person’s landed property in the use of an agricultural co-operative.)
Undoubtedly, in his person also the employee is member of the agricultural 
co-operative collective, i. e. he ties up his working capacity in its entirety with 
the co-operative assets in the same way as the co-operative member, and for 
this reason he will participate in the profits on the basis of work he has contri­
buted, still he cannot exercise the owners’ rights of the member in respect of 
co-operative property. Consequently, in a production-co-operative collective, 
not all of it are the subjects of co-operative ownership; only those are, who are 
members of this collective by virtue of the legal relation which follows from co­
operative membership.
The non-producing co-operative collectives, i. e. consumers’ co-operatives, 
savings and housing co-operatives, come into being on the basis of financial 
contribution. A co-operative pooling of this kind indicates that the co-operative 
members participate in the operations of the co-operative with a definite por­
tion in terms of money, whereas in this status they do not tie up their working 
capacity with the co-operative assets, i. e. even as members of the co-operative 
they have free disposal of their working capacity.
In co-operatives of this category, co-operative membership only expresses 
the status of an owner, but not the status as a worker. Naturally, this does not 
mean as if the members of the co-operatives of this category were barred from 
personal co-operation. The members are entitled to a personal co-operation in 
the management of the co-operative, to the exercise of proprietary rights, but 
as members they are not bound to contribute to the co-operative with their 
working capacity. From time to time, as individuals, they may do so, but 
simply as employees, and not as co-operative members. Co-operative member­
ship may be an advantage only in so far as in case of more applicants, the co­
operative member must be given priority for employment, other conditions be­
ing equal.
Hence in co-operative collectives brought about on a financial basis the 
status of an owner and of a worker are wholly independent of each other, i. e. 
in these instances the co-operative owners’ and co-operative workers’ collectives 
are completely separated from each other. This separation finds expression also 
in the circumstance that in co-operatives existing on a financial basis the ow­
ners’ collectives exclusively consist of the members of the co-operative, whereas 
the collective of co-operative workers is a collective of employees, irrespective 
of whether the workers of the co-operative, often in the aggregate, but to a 
greater or lesser extent are practically in each co-operative at the same time 
also members of the “employers’ co-operative owners’ collective” merely by 
virtue of membership in the collective.
What has been set forth so far in connexion with the subject of co-operative 
ownership indicates that law can, beyond a general rule or two, hardly say more 
of who are subjects of co-operative ownership in a manner uniformly valid for 
all forms of co-operative ownership. In fact, the deeper we try to explore one or 
another form of co-operative ownership, the more the peculiarities of these 
forms will come into prominence. For all forms of co-operative ownership, 
uniformly, and with general validity, the following statement may be made: 
The subject of co-operative ownership is the co-operative as a juristic person, 
further those who are subjects of the co-operative collective, composed of the
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co-operative property and the co-operative members. Beyond this rule, already 
the specific rules will emerge as far as the subjects of co-operative property are 
concerned, the ownership relations of whom manifest themselves already in 
conjunction with rules applying to other aspects (e. g. in the rules governing 
membership relations.)
There is a difference between a producing co-operative created on a perso­
nal basis, and another relying on the assets of the members, also in the manner 
where and how the owner status of the co-operative members finds an ex­
pression.
In producing co-operatives the members share the profits yielded by the 
exploitation of co-operative property on the basis of the work performed by 
them, and chances of sharing in a manner independent of the work performed, 
or by any other title, are negligible (e. g. social, sporting, cultural benefits, land 
rent, rent incident on stocks, etc.). However, even in these co-operatives there 
is opportunity for an unaided accumulation of assets by members, i. e. the full 
value of the work performed by the members cannot be paid for, since part of 
the profits will remain in the co-operative for being added to the net assets. 
However, in the present system of distribution the co-operative owner members 
do not act a share from this value directly, i. e. the way in which profits are 
distributed does not express the rates by which the co-operative members have 
contributed to accumulation through not having received the full equivalent of 
their work. This problem leads to raising the problem of the rent of accumula­
tion in producing co-operatives. Primarily, this is a problem of the national 
economy, but one calling for a statutory regulation. In producing co-operatives 
where the aged or disabled members on pension receive a supplement to their 
pensions, or benefits of other kinds, although essentially in an everyday form, 
the idea of the payment of a rent on accumulations may be discovered, adjusted 
not only to the work the members concerned have performed in the co-opera­
tive during the many years of their active service, but at least to the same 
extent as the financial contributions made in particular during the phase of 
collectivization, when these contributions had a significant role in the creation 
of co-operative property and joint co-operative assets.
In non-producing co-operatives proprietorship of the members mani­
fests itself in the material sense by the ratio of their financial interest in the 
co-operative, namely in the form of a rent-like benefit (rent or interest payable 
on the member’s share, on deposits in savings banks, etc.), or, on the contrary, 
in the form of a proportional contribution to the costs of administration of the 
joint property, chargeable to the personal incomes of the members (costs of 
maintenance of the joint property of housing co-operatives, etc.).
In certain cases the material manifestation form of the owners’ status 
may have repercussions also on membership relations. In agricultural co­
operatives, membership of the retiring member does not cease, i.e. the retired 
member will continue to be co-operative member, and he will have opportu­
nity to exercise his proprietary rights directly even at a time by which he had 
met his obligation to work once for all. True, this system has been enforced 
consistently only in agricultural co-operatives, whereas in artisans’ co-opera­
tives the law leaves regulation to the statutes of the co-opertaive. However, 
if statutory regulation is to be consistent even in this respect, then inevitably 
the same rules will have to be enforced in the artisans’ co-opertaives as in the
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agricultural co-operatives. Naturally a solution in the opposite sense is also 
conceivable, i.e. a generalization of the rules valid for artisans’ co-operatives 
by extending them to the agricultural co-operatives. However, this method 
would lack a basic principle, not to speak of the need for an amendment of the 
provisions governing the pensions of agricultural co-operative members so as 
to adapt them to those governing the pensions of the members of artisans’ 
co-operatives.
In non-producing co-operatives the material manifestation of the owner 
status of co-operative members does not raise issues of this kind. But prob­
lems of propietary rights may emerge which have their origin partly in the 
divisibility of co-operative property (shares, etc.), partly in the integral unity 
of co-operative and personal property (housing co-operatives), i.e. problems 
which are unknown in producing co-operatives. For non-producing co-opera­
tives such specific issues are e.g the alienation or the inheritance of the share 
of the co-operative member, i.e. issues of ownership and property which follow 
from the commodity character of the share of the co-operative member 
within a definite scope.
Since there are obvious discrepancies between the material manifestations 
of the owners’ status of the members of producing and non-producing co­
operatives, the conclusion is that one person can at the same time only be 
member of one producing co-operative and of one non-producing co-operative. 
In principle it is precluded that one person could be member of several co­
operatives of which two are of the producing type.
3. The sphere of the objects of co-operative ownership is again one where 
essentially only a single legal characteristic will qualify the various forms of 
co-operative ownership. Otherwise, or beyond this, the discrepancies will 
come to the fore. This common characteristic may be summarized in a sense 
that each co-operative may become owner of the assets required for the achi­
evement of the end specified by its statutes.
However, this general and uniform statutory formulation of the object 
of co-operative property cannot be satisfactory for the particular concrete 
forms of co-operatives, or in the statutory definition of the concrete forms of 
co-operative ownersip. On the other hand, if the sphere of objects in co­
operative ownership has to satisfy such conditions, then in principle a line 
has to be drawn between the two large groups of co-operatives, viz. between 
the producing and non-producing co-operatives.
I t  is a characteristic feature of the ownership of producing co-operatives 
that here the sphere of objects of co-operative ownership basically extends to 
the means of production needed for co-operative activities, and also to the 
results of production, further to other assets which the co-operative may 
require for the achievement of other ends.
On the other hand, in the case of non-producing co-operatives, the sphere 
of objects of co-operative ownership, in the first place, and overwhelmingly, 
extends to consumer’s goods, or to goods and equipment which cannot be 
ranged, the means of production. This does not mean as if these co-operatives 
could not own means of production for the achievement of their objectives. 
Consequently, there may be, and are, means of production in the ownership 
of non-producing co-operatives; however, here the ratio of ownership related
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to means of production and to means not serving production is reversed, if 
compared to the ratio in producing co-operatives.
An analysis of the sphere of objects of the particular forms of co-operative 
ownership to any depth and in any detail will finally lead to the general con­
clusion that the spheres of objects of each particular form of co-operative 
ownership basically differ from one another by the particular branches and 
forms of co-operatives. Consequently, and principally, it is not the common 
features, but the differences that are characteristic of the objects of co-opera­
tive ownership. This is wholly reasonable, since the sphere of objects of co­
operative ownership are attached directly and closely to the differences 
appearing in the ends and spheres of activities of the co-operatives. Essentially, 
this general statement applies also to the economic associations of the co­
operatives, or, more precisely, to the sphere of objects in the ownership of 
these associations.
4. Depending on definite conditions, the situation, as regards the contents 
of co-operative ownership, is in some respect the reversed of that of the cate­
gory of objects of co-operative ownership.
The situation is reversed merely because in the democratic system of 
co-operative ownership the content of co-operative ownership has to be 
uniform for all forms of co-operative ownership. Hence in this case the common 
characteristics, and not the discrepancies are preponderant.
On the other hand, when the mixed system of co-operative ownership 
prevails, the content of co-operative ownership will be different for each form 
of co-operative ownership. The difference will depend on whether the given 
form of co-operative ownership exists in a centralized co-operative federal 
organization, or exists without such a co-operative federal organization 
(centre), in the framework of a democratic co-operative federal organization 
(centre). Essentially, the difference will manifest itself in the scope of the 
right of disposal In a centralized system, the right of disposal of the co-opera­
tive managing the assets, and actually operating, is to a greater or lesser 
degree limited. On the other hand, the right of disposal of co-operatives operat­
ing independently of a federal organization, i.e. within the framework of a 
democratic federal organization, will be exercised by the owner co-operative 
managing the assets and operating them in their entirety.
In Hungary, the enforcement of the democratic system of co-operative 
ownership is the goal, and therefore in the content of co-operative owenership, 
for each form of co-operative ownership, primacy has been accorded to the 
common characteristic features.
However, to this we have to add that notwithstanding there may be, and 
even are, discrepancies among the particular forms of co-operative ownership, 
as far as the content of this ownership is concerned. However, these discrepan­
cies will appear in the first place in the inner co-operative relations, and not 
in the external ownership relations, or more precisely, in the inner co-operative 
ownership relations, i.e. in the way the content of ownership prevails within the 
co-operative. Still, this depends primarily on the inner organizational methods 
of operation of the co-operative, on the system of the inner management of the 
co-opex-ative.
In connexion with the intrinsic discrepancies it must be emphasized again 
that in a co-operative the self-assertion of the content of ownership is on the
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whole attached to the owners’ collective of the co-operative in each case. 
Care has to be taken that these discrepancies should not be responsible for 
a cessation of the direct exercise of the rights vested in the owners’ collective 
of the co-operative, i.e. to an alienation of co-operative ownership.
5. Apart from the fact that identities and differences between the one 
form of co-operative ownership and another are present also in other spheres 
of ownership so far ignored (acquisition and termination of ownership, etc.), 
yet another problem has to be discussed briefly by way of conclusion. This is 
the problem of the interaction of co-operative ownership and the economic 
environment.
The relationship between co-operative ownership and economic environ­
ment, between the form of co-operative ownership and any other form of 
ownership, are of utmost significance in the socialist system of ownership. In 
fact it is the environment which, in addition to the inner peculiarities of co­
operative ownership, primarily defines the character, extent, enforcement 
and the conditions of co-operative property, i.e. the place, function and 
significance of the part in the whole.
Without presenting the totality of the problem in its principal outlines, 
three salient questions will have to be touched in any case.
a)  First of all, it should be remembered that any form of co-operative 
ownership is the equal, integral part of the socialist system of social ownership. 
The external ownership relations come into being on this understanding, so 
that from this point of view there is no difference between the various forms 
of co-operative ownership.
b)  Similarly, state supervision and control are uniform for each form of 
co-operative ownership. However, concrete manifestation, the methods, etc. 
of this control differ from one another, and, what is of particular significance, 
state subsidies are differentiated by the forms of co-operative ownership. 
This differentiation finds an accentuated expression in financial grants to 
co-operatives.
In connexion with this question it should be specially stressed that budge­
tary subsidy for co-operatives has to be most intensive as far as the agricultural 
co-operatives are concerned. The principle of state subsidies has to be en­
forced in these co-operatives mainly because in. a socialist agriculture large- 
farming is realized owerwhelmingly in the form of agricultural co-operative 
large-scale farms. Consequently, any financial aid extended to these farms 
will redound to state subsidy for socialist agriculture as a whole. On the other 
hand, this system of subsidies is an objective economic need in any modern 
industrial commodity-producing society, no matter if capitalist or socialist, 
and therefore, among the forms of co-operative ownership agricultural co-ope­
rative ownership should be granted state support to the highest degree, and 
most intensely in the first place.
Similarly, yet for other economic reasons, housing co-operatives i.e. the 
forms of ownership embodied by the housing co-operatives (i.e. fixed personal 
property and joint co-operative group property) deserve increased state subsidy 
whereas the state subsidy to other forms of co-operative ownership may, for 
different considerations, move within narrower channels.
c) Whereas, in general, co-operative ownership is in interrelationship 
with the other forms of the socialist system of ownership on the basis of an
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equality of rights, the mutual relation between co-operative ownership and 
personal ownership is differentiated by the specific and co-operative forms of 
ownership.
To illustrate how this differentiated relationship manifests itself in parti­
cular forms of co-operative ownership, the following may be quoted by way 
of example: Whereas in an artisans’ co-operative, by virtue of co-operative 
management and work performed there, the primary source of personal 
ownership is co-operative ownership, in an agricultural co-operative personal 
ownership is to a certain extent organically attached to co-operative group 
ownership in the form of household plots, and although primarily agricultural 
co-operative ownership is the source of personal ownership of the members, 
this latter may be, and even is, in a certain sense the source of the former. 
Compared to this, there is even a more intense organic interwining between 
personal ownership and co-operative ownership in the housing co-operatives, 
since here the source of co-operative ownership is expressly personal ownership, 
but at the same time this co-operative ownership respects ties down and de­
fines in many respects the limits of personal ownership in respect of the apart­
ment constituting personal property, not to mention that here both co-opera­
tive and personal ownership basically rely on subsidies by the state. As a matter 
of fact, in the creation and preservation of both, financial support by the state 
has a principal role.
By way of conclusion I should like to emphasize that the exploration of 
the uniform and diverse peculiarities of the different forms of co-operative 
ownership is an important task of jurisprudence for the purpose of both legisla­
tion and the enforcement of law. This study may lay claim to being an initial 
step in this work, so that the objective of the author is to raise part of the prob­
lems, rather than to propose a solution to them. I t maybe hoped, however, 
that in the foreseeable future explorations in this field will come to a stage 
where it will be possible to rely on the results of detail work, and to give with 
appropriate generalizing and summarizing work a conclusive picture of the 
general, common, and of the diverse, traits of the socialist system of ownership.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
U nter den allgem einen (gemeinsamen) Zügen der genossenschaftlichen Eigentum sform en 
ist vor allem der G rundsatz der G leichw ertigkeit der gesellschaftlichen Eigentum sform en zu 
betonen. Dieser G rundsatz m uss im V erhältnis zwischen dem  genossenschaftlichen und  dem 
staatlichen  gesellschaftlichen E igentum  sowie im V erhältnis der genossenschaftlichen E igentum s­
formen un tereinander zu r G eltung komm en.
Die Schaffung eines E inklanges zwischen E igentum  und W irtschaftung is t ein w eiterer 
w ichtiger G rundsatz, der den Interessen der sozialistischen W irtschaft en tsprich t. Das bedeu te t 
in der G enossenschaft einen den Interessen der genossenschaftlichen W irtschaft entsprechenden 
unm itte lbaren  Einklang zwischen E igentum  und W irtschaftung. Das genossenschaftliche E igen­
tum  kann n u r au f dem  N iveau des G ruppeneigentum s m it der genossenschaftlichen W irtschaft 
vollkomm en und u nm itte lbar übereinstim m en. Dies wird am  besten im dem okratischen genossen­
schaftlichen E igentum ssystem  verw irklicht, das auch in U ngarn e rs t beim  Ü bergang au f  das 
System  des neuen W irtschaftsm echanism us in allen Genossenschaftszweigen allgemein einge­
fü h rt wurde.
K om m t eine G enossenschaft au f persönlicher, bzw. au f persönlicher und V erm ögensgrund­
lage zustande, so ist das genossenschaftliche E igentum  in der Kegel zum  grössten Teil unteilbar. 
K om m t sie aber ausschliesslich, bzw. prim är au f  V ermögensgrundlage zustande, so is t das ge-
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nossensehaftlicho E igentum  in der Regel teilbar, kann  ab er teilweise oder auch  ganz u n te ilb ar 
sein. E s is t eine allgemeine prinzipielle Forderung, dass die T eilbarkeit des genossenschaftlichen 
E igen tum s le tz ten  E ndes n ich t zum  Zustandekom m en und  zur Festigung der P riva tw irtschaft 
fü h rt. Die U n te ilbarkeit des genossenschaftlichen E igentum s is t dem  W esen nach n ichts anderes, 
als die konkrete  Erscheinungsform  des volkseigenen C harakters des gesellschaftlichen E igentum s 
im  Falle des genossenschaftlichen G ruppeneigentum s.
D er K reis der O bjekte des genossenschaftlichen E igen tum s is t äusserlieh besch ränk t, in ­
dem  die ausschliesslichen O bjekte des S taatseigen tum s prinzipiell n ich t O bjekte des genossen­
schaftlichen E igentum s sein können. Im  ungarischen E igentum srechtssystem  g ib t es u n te r  den 
ausschliesslichen O bjekten des S taatseigentum s zur Zeit keine solche grundlegenden P roduk tions­
und  A rbeitsm ittel, die zur V erw irklichung der staatsm ässigen Ziele der bestehenden G enossen­
schaften  als ju ristischer Personen notw endig wären. D er K reis d e r O bjekte des genossenschaftli­
chen E igentum s is t im m erlieh durch  die G ebundenheit der G enossenschaft als einer zielgebunde­
nen juristischen Person beschränkt. Die R echtsfäh igkeit der G enossenschaft e rs treck t sich 
bezüglich der O bjekte des genossenschaftlichen E igentum s au f  alle Sachen und  V erm ögens­
gegenstände, die zur V erwirklichung der w irtschaftlichen un d  anderen Ziele der G enossenschaft 
notw endig sind. Auch eine gem einsam e U nternehm ung oder ein gem einsam es genossenschaftli­
ches U nternehm en als R echtsperson sind O bjekte des genossenschaftlichen E igentum s.
Ohne H insich t au f  die Genossenschaftszweige m uss, jeder G enossenschaftsverband und  
jede G enossenschaftszentrale einheitlich das R ech t erhalten , an  einer genossenschaftlichen V er­
einigung als G ründer oder als B eitre tender teilzunehm en, bzw. ein eigenes genossenschaftliches 
U nternehm en zu gründen.
2. Das gem einsam e genossenschaftliche E igentum  als E rgebnis der W irtschaftsverinigun- 
gen der G enossenschaften kom m t e rs t dann  zustande, wenn die Vereinigung als selbständige ju ­
ristische Person funktion iert.
W enn zwei oder m ehrere Genossenschaften desselben Genossenschaftszweiges bzw. m ehre­
rer Genossenschaftszweige eine w irtschaftliche Vereinigung bilden, so is t das so en tstandene 
E igen tum  gemeinsam es genossenschaftliches E igentum . W enn dagegen zwei oder m ehrere Ge­
nossenschaften desselben oder m ehrerer Genossenschaftszweige und  ein oder m ehrere S ta a ts ­
un ternehm en eine w irtschaftliche Vereinigung bilden, bzw. in B etrieb halten , so is t das so zu ­
standegekom m ene E igentum  ein gem ischtes gemeinsam es gesellschaftliches E igentum . In  diesem 
le tz teren  Fall wäre eine derartige R egelung als M inimum erw ünscht, w onach die Teilnehm er der 
Vereinigung selbst den genossenschaftlichen oder nichtgenossenschaftlichen C harak te r einer 
solchen gem ischten w irtschaftlichen Vereinigung bestim m en können. Ü brigens wäre die Schaffung 
eines einheitlichen V ereinigungsrechtes erw ünscht.
Auch als E rgebnis einer gesellschaftlichen Vereinigung der G enossenschaften kom m t ein 
gewisses gemeinsam es Vermögen zustande (Gegenseitiges U nterstü tzungsfonds), das un te ilbar 
is t und  das im Interesse der genossenschaftlichen G em einschaften des gegebenen G enossenschafts­
zweiges entsprechend zu verw enden ist. E in solches genossenschaftliches E igentum  b ilde t aber 
ein „genossenschaftliches G em einschaftseigentum “ .
3. N eben den allgem einen, gem einsam en Zügen besitzen die genossenschaftlichen E igen­
tum sform en auch abw eichende besondere Züge. E in  Teil dieser abw eichenden B esonderheiten 
erscheint in einer anderen Form  bei den Produktionsgenossenschaften und  wieder anders bei 
den übrigen G enossenschaften, — ein anderer Teil dieser B esonderheiten erscheint dagegen bei 
sozusagen allen Genossenschaftszweigen anders. So is t z. B. der Fachkreis des genossenschaftli­
chen E igentum s ein anderer bei den Produktionsgenossenschaften und  wieder anders bei den 
übrigen G enossenschaften. Dagegen is t der In h a lt des E igentum srech ts im allgem einen bei jeder 
genossenschaftlichen Eigentum sform  einheitlich, wobei aber in den inneren E igen tum sverhält­
nissen schon Abweichungen vorhanden sind, die im  G runde genom m en von dem  inneren organi­
satorischen A ufbau, von der inneren V erw altung der Genossenschaft abhängen.
H insichtlich der F unk tion  des genossenschaftlichen E igentum s sind die w irtschaftliche 
U m gebung sowie die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen dem  genossenschaftlichen E igentum  
und den übrigen E igentum sform en von sehr grosser B edeutung.
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РЕЗЮМЕ
Среди общих черт форм кооперативной собственности подчёркивается прежде всего 
принцип равноправности правовых норм общественной собственности. Una должна о с у -  
ществоваться в отношении друг к другу между кооперативной собственностью и государ­
ственной общественной собственностью, равно как и в отношении друг к другу форм 
кооперативной собственности.
Важным принципом является также создание согласия, соответствующее интере­
сам социалистического хозяйства между собственностью и хозяйством. В кооперативе 
этот принцип означает непосредственную координацию, соответствующую интересам 
кооперативного хозяйства между собственностью и хозяйством. Кооперативная собствен­
ность становится полной лишь на уровне групповой собственности и находится в не­
посредственной координации с кооперативным хозяйством. Это осуществляется прежде 
всего в системе демократической кооперативной собственности, которая и у нас стала все­
общей во всех отраслях кооператива путём перехода на систему нового хозяйственного 
механизма.
Если кооператив создаётся на личной основе, или на личной и имущественной осно­
ве, то кооперативная собственность оказывается большей частью неразделимой как пра­
вило. Однако, если, он создаётся на имущественной, или первично на имущественной осно­
ве, то кооперативная собственность оказывается, как правило, разделили'!, но её конструк­
ция может быть частично или целиком неразделима. В отношении общего принципа тре­
буется, чтобы делимость кооперативной собственности не могла вести в конечном итоге к 
созданию и укреплению частного ведения хозяйства. Неразделимость кооперативной соб­
ственности не является по существу лишь формой конкретного появления всенародного 
характера общественной собственности в случае кооперативной групповой собственности.
Объективная сфера права собственности кооперативной собственности оказывается 
по внешнему виду ограчиненной таким образом, что исключительные предметы права го­
сударственной собственной принципиально не м о г у т  быть предметами права кооператив­
ной собственности. Среди исключительных предметов права государственной собствен­
ности не находятся теперь в системе венгерского права собственности такие основные 
средства и орудия, которые н у ж н ы  для осуществления уставной цели существующих ко­
оперативов как юридических лиц. Сфера предметов права кооперативной собственности 
ограничена внутренне в следствие связяанности кооперативов как юридических лиц с 
целью. Правоспособность кооператива относительно предметов кооперативной способ­
ности распространяется на все вещи, имущества, нужные для осуществления экономи­
ческих и других целей кооператива. Предметом кооперативной собственности является 
общее предприятие и общее кооперативное предприятие как юридическое лицо.
Без учёта кооперативных отраслей всем кооперативным союзам и центрам надо 
единодушно дать право участвовать в кооперативном объединении как основатели и как 
присоединющиеся.
2. В результате экономических объединений кооперативов общая кооперативная 
собственность создаётся в случае, когда объединение действует самостоятельным юриди­
ческим лицом.
Если экономическое объединение создаётся двумя или несколькими кооперативами, 
принадлежащими к одинаковой отрасли кооператива, или д в у м я  пли несколькими коопе­
ративами, пренадлежащими к д в у м  или нескольким кооперативам, то так созданная соб­
ственность является общей кооперативной собственностью.
Однако, если, экономическое объединение создаётся или вводится в строй д в у м я  
или несколькими кооперативами, принадлежащими к одной или другой кооперативной 
отрасли и одним или несколькими государственными предприятиями, то так созданная 
собственность является смешанной общей общественной собственностью. В последнем 
случае такое урегулирование было бы желательным как м и н и м у м ,  чтобы объединяющиеся 
сами могли определить кооперативный или некооперативный характер такого смешанного 
объединения. Впроче.м было бы желательным создание единого права объединения.
В результате общественного сплочения кооперативов создаётся некое общее иму­
щество (Взаимный Фонд Поддержки), которое является неразделимо и которое должно 
быть употреблено соответствующим образом в интересах кооперативных коллективно­
стей. принадлежащих к данной кооперативной отрасли. Такая кооперативная собствен­
ность является уже „коллективным имуществом кооператива”.
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3. Кроме их общих черт формы кооперативной собственности имеют и различные 
особенности, часть которых появляется другим образом в кооперативах производственного 
типа и опять другим образом в иных кооперативах — их другая часть появляется другим 
образом в почти всех кооперативных отраслях. Так, например, сфера предметов коопе­
ративной собственности появляется в кооперативах производственного типа и опять 
иначе в других кооперативах. Однако, содержание вообще едино в случае всех форм 
кооперативной собственности, но во внутренних собственнических отношениях имеются 
различия, зависящие в основном от внутренней организационной конструкции, от внут­
реннего управления.
С точки зрения деятельности кооперативной собственности очень важным является 
экономическая обстановка, а также взаимная связь между кооперативной собственностью 
и другими формами кооперативной собственности.
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